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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DAVID LEE HEWITT,

i
Case No. 930035-CA

Petitioner and Appellant, !
V.

J

STATE OF UTAH,

:
i

Respondent and Appellee.

Priority No. 3

;

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the district court's denial of a
petition for extraordinary writ brought under Rule 65B, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

This appeal is taken from a decision of the

district court involving a challenge to petitioner's sentence for
a second degree felony conviction; therefore, original appellate
jurisdiction lies with the Utah Court of Appeals under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2)(g) (Supp. 1992).
ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL
1.
waived

Did the district court correctly conclude that petitioner
his

complaints when

he

failed

to raise

them

at the

sentencing hearing and on direct appeal?
2.

Does Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1

(1992), the habeas

corpus statute of limitations, unconstitutionally "suspend" the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and, therefore, violate
article I, section 5 of the Utah Constitution.

1

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
On appeal from denial of a petition for post-conviction
relief, the appellate court "'survey[s] the record in the light
most favorable to the findings and judgment; and [it] will not
reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to support the trial
court's refusal to be convinced that the writ should be granted,'"
Bundv v. DeLand, 763 P. 2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988) (quoting Velasquez
v. Pratt, 21 Utah 2d 229, 232, 443 P.2d 1020, 1022 (1967)).

When

the denial includes rulings on questions of law, the-trial court's
legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Stewart v. State, 830 P. 2d
306, 308-09 (Utah App. 1992).

A trial court's findings of fact

will be disturbed only if clearly erroneous.

Id.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following provisions are included in Addendum A to this
brief.

Other relevant pleadings and documents, including the

summary decision and order of the trial court, are also included in
the Addenda.
Utah Const, art. I, § 5.
Utah Const, art. V.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B (1992).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises from petitioner's sentencing on February 4,
1991 before Third District Court Judge Michael Murphy for the crime
of retail theft, a second degree felony.

Judge Murphy sentenced

Petitioner to a term of imprisonment for not less than one nor more
2

than fifteen years.

(Judgment, Sentence (Commitment), attached as

Addendum B.)
On February 19, 1992, more than one year after receiving his
sentence, petitioner filed a petition for extraordinary relief with
the Third District Court.

(R. at 2-5; Attached as Addendum C,

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Relief, Case
No. 920900909, Third District Court.) In his petition, petitioner
claimed that the sentencing court had received and acted upon
erroneous

and

misleading

investigation report (PSI).

information

in

the

pre-sentence

(R. at 3; Addendum C.)

Further, petitioner also alleged that the Adult Probation &
Parole (AP&P) agent who had written the report was prejudiced and
biased and that the court had failed to ask petitioner during
sentencing if he and his counsel had reviewed and discussed the
PSI.

Petitioner later filed an amended petition, which did not

substantively change the nature of his allegations.

(R. at 58-61;

Attached as Addendum D, Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
and Post Conviction Relief, Case No. 920900909, Third District
Court, filed June 17, 1992.)
The State was ordered to respond to the petition (R. at 18-19)
and filed a motion to dismiss and memorandum in support.

The

motion to dismiss was based upon the argument that petitioner could
and should have raised his complaints in regular appellate review;
that the statute of limitations barred the petition; and that the
petition did not comply with the procedural requirements of Rule
65B.

(R. at 21-29; Attached as Addendum E, Motion to Dismiss,
3

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Case No, 920900909,
Third District Court, filed March 13, 1992.) Petitioner responded
to the motion on March 30, 1992. (R. at 31-35; Attached as Addendum
F, Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in
Support, Case No. 920900909.)
After requesting the State to order a copy of the transcript
of petitioner's sentencing hearing (R. at 56), the district court
entered a Summary Decision and Order, which dismissed the petition
on the grounds of waiver and statute of limitations.

(R. at 81;

Attached as Addendum G, Summary Decision and Order, Third District
Court, Case No. 920900909, filed December 15, 1992.)

Petitioner

filed his notice of appeal on January 14, 1993.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The (acts pertinent to this case are set out in the Statement
of the Case.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In his petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner claimed
that the sentencing court committed various procedural errors
during his sentencing, primarily that it relied on biased and
misleading information in the PSI. Petitioner admits that he never
pursued his claims on direct appeal, nor did he state his concerns
to the sentencing judge during the sentencing hearing.

(R. at 3;

Addendum C.)
Extraordinary relief pursuant to Rule 65B is not a substitute
for regular appellate review.

Because petitioner's claims could

and should have been raised on direct appeal, the court's judgment
4

is

final

and

not

subject

extraordinary relief.

to

collateral

attack

by

way

of

Therefore, the court's dismissal on the

grounds of waiver was proper and should be affirmed.
Petitioner does not provide any legal analysis challenging
Judge

Murphy's

finding

of

waiver;

therefore

under

previous

decisions of the Utah appellate courts, any claims that he may have
had on that issue should be considered abandoned. Thus, this Court
should decide Petitioner's case solely on the issue of waiver and
not reach petitioner's

constitutional arguments regarding the

habeas corpus statute of limitations.
Nevertheless, although the State respectfully suggests that
this Court can and should avoid the constitutional issues raised by
Petitioner, the State submits that the statute of limitations as
applied in this case does not violate the suspension clause of
article

I,

section

5.

Article

I,

section

5 of

the

Utah

Constitution prohibits suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus unless required by the public safety, rebellion, or
invasion.

In determining the applicability of the suspension

clause to Petitioner's case, it is necessary to look at the writ of
habeas corpus as it existed when the Utah Constitution was drafted
and ratified.

At common law and at that time in the Utah courts,

the writ of habeas corpus was available only to challenge a court's
jurisdiction, not to collaterally attack a conviction.
Utah appellate courts have greatly expanded the writ of habeas
corpus and have by rule created a post-conviction relief procedure.
However, as a limitation on legislative power, the suspension
5

clause

can

only

properly

be

read

as

a

prohibition

on the

legislative power to "suspend" the common law writ of habeas
corpus.

The framers of the constitution could not have known that

in the future the appellate courts would transform the writ of
habeas

corpus

into

a

remedy

for

constitutional

violations•

Therefore, the framers' anti-suspension language cannot fairly be
applied to that transformed writ.

Petitioner's petition also is

not one that would have been granted habeas corpus relief at common
law. It neither challenges the sentencing court's jurisdiction nor
alleges that the sentence imposed was unlawful.

Therefore, this

case does not present a situation where the State is attempting to
limit common law habeas corpus via Section 78-12-31.1.1
Petitioner's claims are cognizable only through the postconviction relief procedure of Rule 65B, the codification of the
judicial expansion of habeas corpus and the common law writ of
error and error coram nobis. Article I, section 5 simply does not
apply to that modern evolution of habeas corpus and, therefore,
petitioner's suspension argument should be rejected.
Additionally, petitioner's other claims in his brief before
this Court, which include the reasonableness of the three month
limitations period, a due process challenge, and the applicability
of the "open courts" provision of the state constitution, Utah

1

Whether the state could appropriately enact any limitation
period on the common law writ of habeas corpus is not presented in
this case because Hewitt's petition does not raise claims that were
cognizable in common law habeas proceedings.

6

Const, art. I, § 11, were not raised in the trial court and
therefore should not now be reviewed on appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE PETITION
ON THE GROUNDS OF WAIVER AND FAILURE TO PURSUE
A DIRECT APPEAL.
Petitioner

did

not

challenge

his

conviction,

but

the

proceeding before the sentencing court that resulted in his 1 to 15
year sentence.

In his amended petition, petitioner claimed that

the sentencing judge erred by relying on misleading and erroneous
information, accepting a presentence investigation report (PSI)
from an allegedly biased agent, and failing to ask petitioner if he
had seen the PSI and discussed it with his counsel.
Amended Petition, Addendum D.)

(R. at 58-60;

The district court dismissed the

petition on two grounds: waiver and statute of limitations.

From

its review of the transcript of the sentencing proceeding, the
court found that petitioner either knew or should have known of the
issues raised in his post-conviction petition at the time of
sentencing and that he could and should have raised those issues at
the hearing and on a direct appeal.
The district court ruled that petitioner waived his complaints
by not raising them through regular procedures.

"The other

allegations [of the petition] share at least three characteristics:
(1) they were not raised at the sentencing hearing; (2) had they
been raised they could have and would have been addressed; and (3)
they were not the subject of a direct appeal."
7

(R. at 82; Summary

Decision and Order, Case No, 92090090, Third District Court, filed
December 15f 1992 (Order, Addendum G.)
As petitioner admitted in his amended petition, as well as in
his original petition, he did not pursue a direct appeal from
either his conviction or his sentence. (R. at 59; Amended Petition
at 2, Addendum D.)

The district court correctly dismissed the

petition for those reasons. In Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440
P.2d 968 (1968), the Utah Supreme Court recognized that a petition
for post-conviction relief was an "extraordinary" remedy and not a
substitute for regular appellate review.
Morris/ 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983).

See also Codianna v.

Contrary to the plain command

of the lawf petitioner has attempted to use Rule 65B(b) to correct
his failure to raise his complaints in the proper manner.
Although a petitioner's
regular

failure to raise claims through

appellate review is excused

by showing

that unusual

circumstances prevented the use of a regular appeal, Codianna, 660
P. 2d at 1105, petitioner did not show such unusual circumstances in
his petition.

His petition stated that he did not appeal the

sentence because he "was never informed by counsel that the Court
had errored [sic] during sentencing."

(R. at 3.)

This is likely

because there was, in fact, no error in sentencing.

The Sixth

Amendment does not require defense counsel to file a meaningless or
frivolous appeal or to tell a client that there are errors when
there are none.

8

POINT II
BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED
THE PETITION DUE TO WAIVER AND FAILURE TO
PURSUE A DIRECT APPEAL, THIS COURT DOES NOT
NEED TO REACH PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ABOUT THE
HABEAS CORPUS STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Petitioner's brief is primarily devoted to his claim that
section 78-12-31.1 (1992) suspends the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.2 Suspension of the privilege is prohibited by the
Utah Constitution.

Utah Const, art. I, § 5.

It does not appear

that Utah's appellate courts have ever directly analyzed this
provision of the constitution, even though the general topic of
habeas corpus has been extensively litigated.

Only

in

a

concurring opinion of Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 796 (Utah 1990)
(Zimmerman, J., concurring, joined in by Stewart, J.), have two
justices of the Utah Supreme Court expressed their opinion that the
legislature could not validly impose a limitation on habeas corpus.
In State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985), the
court stated that it is a fundamental rule that courts should avoid
addressing

constitutional

issues

whenever

possible.

This

fundamental rule seems especially pertinent when the constitutional
issue is one of first impression.
2

In this case, the Court can

Petitioner also raises several other issues in his brief,
including an argument relating to the open courts provision of the
Utah Constitution, a claim that section 78-12-31.1 violates due
process, an allegation that imprisonment should toll the statute of
limitations, and a challenge to the court's procedures in
dismissing the petition. Also, petitioner seems to argue that the
three month limitation period is unreasonable. As discussed in
Point IV of this brief, these issues were not raised at the
district court level and should not be reviewed on appeal.

9

sustain the district court's order solely on the basis of waiver.
With such a procedural posture, any discussion regarding the
constitutionality
opinion only.

of section

78-12-31.1 would be an advisory

Thus, this Court should not reach the statute's

constitutionality.
However, in order to preserve its argument should this Court
decide to reach the constitutional question, the State will in
Point III discuss the merits.
POINT III
THE
CONSTITUTIONAL
PROHIBITION
ON
THE
SUSPENSION OF HABEAS CORPUS APPLIES ONLY TO
HABEAS CORPUS AS IT WAS UNDERSTOOD BY THE
FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION.
Article I, section 5 of the Utah Constitution is a limitation
on legislative power.

In enacting that provision, the people of

the State determined that habeas corpus was such an important facet
of personal liberty that it could be suspended only in certain
circumstances.

However, when that provision was written and

adopted, "habeas corpus" had a specific and very limited meaning.
Therefore, the limitation imposed by the suspension clause was
itself limited.
As understood in the common law and by the Utah Supreme Court
at the time of the writing of the Utah Constitution, the only
question that a court reviewed on a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus was whether the petitioner was being restrained of his
liberty by authority of a governmental entity, usually a court,
which had jurisdiction.

Areson v. Pincock, 62 Utah 527, 530, 220

P. 503 (1923); Winnovich v. Emery, 33 Utah 345, 93 P. 988, 993-994
10

(1908); In re Clark, 28 Utah 268, 78 P. 475 (1904); Ex Parte Hays,
15 Utah 77, 47 P. 612, 613-614 (1897); In re Maughan, 6 Utah 167,
21 P. 1088, 1089 (1889); (these cases are attached as Addendum H);
see also. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court —

Habeas Corpus,

64 Mich. L. Rev. 451, 468 (1966); Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States, at 212 (Little, Brown & Company
1891).
In a series of cases over the last approximately fifteen
years, however, the Utah Supreme Court and this Court have greatly
expanded the scope of habeas corpus3. While discussing the modern
transformation of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court recognized that
the original purposes of the writ were limited to challenging
jurisdiction.

Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1034 (Utah 1989). It

is this limited writ to which article I, section 5 refers, not to
the greatly expanded constitutional remedy contained, in Rule 65B.
As currently interpreted, "habeas corpus" or more properly Rule
65B(b), which is directly at issue in this case, is an amalgamation
of different common-law writs, including habeas corpus, the writ of
3

In Ziegler v. Milliken, 583 P.2d 1175 (Utah 1978), the Utah
Supreme Court allowed the use of habeas corpus to show a violation
of "basic rights." In Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896 (Utah 1981),
the court used a habeas corpus petition to examine conditions of
confinement. This Court Hatch v. Deland, 790 P.2d 49 (Utah 1990),
applied habeas corpus to review decisions of the Board of Pardons
stating that habeas review was available to remedy "violations of
substantial constitutional rights."
The supreme court recognized the transformation of the common
law writ of habeas corpus in Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 10331034 (Utah 1989), a case in which the court stated that the writ
had "absorbed the post-conviction relief remedy" then contained in
Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and that the writ was
"one of the most important of all judicial tools for the protection
of individual liberty."
11

error, and the writ of error coram nobis.

See State v. Johnson,

635 P. 2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981) ("The post-conviction hearing procedure
is a successor to the common-law writ of error coram nobis.").
Therefore, the suspension clause of article I, section 5,
which dealt only with habeas corpus, should not be applied to Rule
65B, which creates remedies that are far more powerful in scope and
availability than the writ to which the delegates to the Utah
Constitutional Convention could have been referring.

Indeed,

because the suspension clause is a limitation on legislative power,
extension of the clause to remedies other than common law habeas
corpus,

would

encroachment
government.

be

a

further

limitation

on legislative power by the

and

unconstitutional

judicial branch of

Such an extra-constitutional encroachment is neither

envisioned nor allowed by the constitution itself.

Utah Const.

Art. V.
Two other state courts have addressed similar challenges that
a statute of limitation on the filing of a petition for postconviction
corpus/

relief

unlawfully

"suspended"

the writ

of

habeas

In Potts v. State, 833 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992)

(attached as Addendum I), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the
suspension clause contained in article I, section 15 of the state
constitution was not abridged by a limitation on filing petitions
for post-conviction relief.

*The State has not found any other cases in which this issue
was precisely addressed.
12

The court ruled that the writ of habeas corpus could "issue
only in the case of a void judgment or to free a prisoner held in
custody after his term of imprisonment has expired,"
S.W.2d at 62.

Potts, 833

This statement reflects the meaning of common law

habeas corpus in the Tennessee courts and as codified by that
state's law.

See State ex rel. Newsom v. Henderson, 221 Tenn. 24,

424 S.W.2d 186, 189 (1968).
The Colorado Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion and
gave a more lengthy analysis to the constitutional claim.

As

stated in that opinion:
The
only
claims
cognizable
in
a
constitutionally
guaranteed
habeas
corpus
proceeding are these: (1) the sentence was beyond
jurisdictional limits, or (2) the conviction was
invalid because the court lacked jurisdiction over
the subject matter or the defendant. . . . Instead,
the statute [enacting a limitation period on the
filing of petitions for post-conviction relief]
limits only those collateral attacks previously
made available by legislative and
judicial
expansion of the scope of postconviction relief
beyond that which is constitutionally mandated.
People v. Robinson, 833 P.2d 832, 836 (Colo. App. 1992), cert.
granted, August 17, 1992.

(Attached as Addendum H.) The Robinson

court's statement on the applicability of habeas corpus reflected
the Colorado Supreme Court's view of the scope of common law habeas
corpus. See Stillev v. Tinslev, 153 Colo. 66, 385 P.2d 677 (1963).
This view similar to that held by Utah courts prior to the modern
expansion of the writ.

See Ex Parte Hays, 15 Utah 77, 47 P. 612,

613-614 (1897); Winnovich v. Emery, 33 Utah 345, 93 P. 988, 993-994
(1908).

13

Petitioner's claim that the suspension clause prohibits the
application

of

section

78-12-31.1

to

post-conviction

relief

proceedings is incorrect. The post-conviction relief procedure set
forth in Rule 65B(b) is not the writ of habeas corpus that is
guaranteed by the constitution.

Therefore, the suspension clause

applies only to habeas corpus proceedings as they were understood
when the constitution was written.
In a law review article discussing collateral attacks on
criminal convictions, a former judge for the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals said:

"It can scarcely be doubted that the writ

protected by the suspension clause is the writ as known to the
framers, not as Congress may have chosen to expand it or, more
pertinently, as the Supreme Court has interpreted what Congress
did."

Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?

Collateral

Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 170 (1970);
See also Swain v. Presslev, 430 U.S. 372, 384-386 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) ("The sweep of the suspension clause must be measured
by

reference

to

the

intention

of

the

Framers

and

their

understanding of what the writ of habeas corpus meant at the time
the Constitution was drafted.").
POINT IV
THE OTHER POINTS PETITIONER RAISES IN HIS
BRIEF WERE NOT RAISED IN THE DISTRICT COURT
AND THEREFORE NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL.
As previously mentioned, petitioner raises numerous issues
other than the suspension argument in his brief to this Court.
However, those issues were not raised to the district court.
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The

only issues petitioner discussed in his response to the State's
motion to dismiss in the district court were (1) the suspension
clause; (2) the claim that he could and should have taken the
issues on direct appeal; and (3) that he procedurally did not
comply with Rule

65B.

(R. at 45; Attached

as Addendum H,

Memorandum in Support of Petitioner [sic] Requests to Deny Motion
to Dismiss, Case No. 920900909, Third District Court, filed March
30, 1992.)
Of the issues petitioner raised before the district court, he
has properly preserved and argued only the suspension clause
argument.

Other issues raised

in petitioner's brief

—

the

applicability of article I, section 11, a due process claim,
tolling, and the reasonableness of the three month period — were
not raised below.

Therefore, under the longstanding rule of this

Court, those claims should not now be reviewed on appeal. Standard
Federal Savings and Loan Assoc, v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136, 1138
(Utah 1991); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991);
Drummond v. Union Pac. R.R. , 111 Utah 289, 177 P.2d 908, 909
(1947).
CONCLUSION
The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
district court's dismissal of the petition.

The district court

correctly concluded that petitioner waived his cTaims when he
failed to raise them either at the sentencing hearing or in a
direct appeal.

Should this Court determine that petitioner's

claims were not waived by failing to appeal, then the Court should
15

reject Petitioner's claim that the suspension clause of article I,
section 5 prohibits the statute of limitations here at issue.
Additionally,

because

petitioner's

other

claims

are not

properly before this Court either because they were not raised in
the district court or they were abandoned or waived on appeal, the
other

issues

contained

in petitioner's

brief

should

not be

considered.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS

iflL

day of May 1993.

JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

James H. Beadles
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the

P ^ day of May 1993, I caused to be

mailed by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to:
David Lee Hewitt
P.O. Box 250
Utah State Prison
Draper, Utah 84020

yUiJJvi
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ADDENDUM A

Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.]
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety requires it.
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company

78-12-31.1- Habeas corpus - Three months.
Within three months:
For relief pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus. This
limitation shall apply not only as to grounds known to petitioner
but also to grounds which in the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have been known by petitioner or counsel for petitioner.
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company

Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief.
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy is available, a person may petition the court for
extraordinary relief on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph
(b) (involving wrongful imprisonment), paragraph (c) (involving
other types of wrongful restraint on personal liberty), paragraph
(d) (involving the wrongful use of public or corporate authority)
or paragraph (e) (involving the wrongful use of judicial authority
and the failure to exercise such authority). There shall be no
special form of writ. The procedures in this rule shall govern
proceedings on all petitions for extraordinary relief. To the
extent that this rule does not provide special procedures,
proceedings on petitions for extraordinary relief shall be governed
by the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules.
(b) Wrongful imprisonment.
(1) Scope. Any person committed by a court to imprisonment in
a state prison, other correctional facility or county jail who
asserts that the commitment resulted from a substantial denial of
rights may petition the court for relief under this paragraph. This
paragraph (b) shall govern proceedings based on claims relating to
original commitments and commitments for violation of probation or
parole. This paragraph (b) shall not govern proceedings based on
claims relating to the terms or conditions of confinement.
(2) Commencement. Except for challenges to parole violation
proceedings, the proceeding shall be commenced by filing a
petition, together with a copy thereof, with the clerk of the
district court in the county in which the commitment leading to
confinement was issued. The court may order a change of venue on
motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses.
Petitions challenging parole violation proceedings shall be
commenced by filing a petition together with a copy thereof, with
the clerk of the district court in the county in which the
petitioner is located.
(3) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth
all claims that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of
the commitment. Additional claims relating to the legality of the
commitment may not be raised in subsequent proceedings except for
good cause shown. The petition shall state;
(A) the place where the petitioner is restrained;
(B) the name of the court by which the petitioner was
convicted and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in which the
conviction was entered, together with the court's case number for
those proceedings, if known by the petitioner;

(C) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts on the
basis of which the petitioner claims a substantial violation of
rights as the result of the commitment;
(D) whether or not the judgment of conviction or the
commitment for violation of probation or parole has been reviewed
on appeal, and, if so, the number and caption or title of the
appellate proceeding and the results of the review;
(E) whether the legality of the commitment has already
been adjudicated in any prior post-conviction or other civil
proceeding, and if so the reasons for the denial of relief in the
prior proceeding.
(4) Attachments to the petition. The petitioner shall attach
to the petition affidavits, copies of records or other evidence
available to the petitioner in support of the allegations. The
petitioner shall also attach to the petition a copy of the
pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction or
other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the
commitment, and a copy of all orders and memoranda of the court. If
copies of pertinent pleadings, orders, and memoranda are not
attached, the petition shall state why they are not attached.
(5) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set
forth argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition,
but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of
which shall be filed with the petition.
(6) Assignment by the presiding judge. On the filing of the
petition, the clerk shall promptly deliver it to the assigned judge
of the court in which it is filed. Except for challenges to parole
violation proceedings, the presiding judge shall if possible assign
the proceeding to the judge who issued the commitment.
(7) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition,
if it is apparent to the court that the issues presented in the
petition have already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if
for any other reason any claim in the petition shall appear
frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order
dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on its
face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner.
Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the
order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings
of fact or conclusions of law.
(8) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the
court concludes that all or part of the petition is not frivolous
on its face, the court shall designate the portions of the petition
that are not frivolous and direct the clerk to serve a copy of the
petition and a copy of any memorandum by mail upon the attorney
general and the county attorney.
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(9) Responsive pleading. Within twenty days (plus time
allowed under these rules for service by mail) after service of a
copy of the petition upon the attorney general and county attorney,
or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the
attorney general or county attorney shall answer or otherwise
respond to the portions of the petition that have not been
dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response upon the
petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within twenty days (plus
time allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to
dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by
memorandum to the motion. No further pleadings or amendments will
be permitted unless ordered by the court.
(10) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall
promptly set the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of
the case. Upon motion for good cause, the court may grant leave to
either party to take discovery or to extend the date for the
hearing. Prior to the hearing, the court may order either the
petitioner or the state or county to obtain any relevant transcript
or court records. The court may also order a prehearing conference,
but the conference shall not be set so as to delay unreasonably the
hearing on the merits of the petition. The petitioner shall be
present before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need
not otherwise be present in court during the proceeding.
(11) Orders. If the court rules in favor of the petitioner,
it shall enter an appropriate order with respect to the validity of
the challenged commitment and with respect to rearraignment,
retrial, resentencing, custody, bail or discharge. The court shall
enter findings of fact and conclusions of law, as appropriate,
following any evidentiary hearing or any hearing on a dispositive
motion. Upon application of the attorney general or the county
attorney, or upon its own motion, the court may stay release of the
petitioner pending appeal of its order.
(12) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding,
as allowed under Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate.
If the petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceeding, the
petitioner may proceed upon an affidavit of impecuniosity, in which
event the court may direct that the costs be paid by .the county in
which the complainant was originally charged.
(13) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the
petition may be appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or
the Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing
appeals to those courts.
(c) Other wrongful restraints on personal liberty.
(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by paragraph (b) of
this rule, this paragraph (c) shall govern all petitions claiming

3

that a person has been wrongfully restrained of personal liberty,
and the court may grant relief appropriate under this paragraph.
(2) Commencement. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing
a petition with the clerk of the court in the district in which the
petitioner is restrained or the respondent resides or in which the
alleged restraint is occurring^
(3) Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition
shall contain a short, plain statement of the facts on the basis of
which the petitioner seeks relief. It shall identify the respondent
and the place where the person is restrained. It shall state the
cause or pretense of the restraint, if known by the petitioner. It
shall state whether the legality of the restraint has already been
adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so, the reasons for the
denial of relief in the prior proceeding. The petitioner shall
attach to the petition any legal process available to the
petitioner that resulted in restraint. The petitioner shall also
attach to the petition a copy of the pleadings filed by the
petitioner in any prior proceeding that adjudicated the legality of
the restraint.
(4) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set
forth argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition,
but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of
which shall be filed with the petition.
(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition,
if it is apparent to the court that the legality of the restraint
has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any
other reason any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on
its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the
claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on its face and the
reasons for this conclusion. The order need not state findings of
fact or conclusions of law. The order shall be sent by mail to the
petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry
of the order of dismissal.
(6) Responsive pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed as
being frivolous on its face, the court shall direct the clerk of
the court to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any
memorandum upon the respondent by mail. At the same time, the court
may issue an order directing the respondent to answer or otherwise
respond to the petition, specifying a time within which the
respondent must comply. If the circumstances require, the court may
also issue an order directing the respondent to appear before the
court for a hearing on the legality of the restraint. An answer to
a petition shall state plainly whether the respondent has
restrained the person alleged to have been restrained, whether the
person so restrained has been transferred to any other person, and
if so, the identity of the transferee, the date of the transfer,
and the reason or authority for the transfer. Nothing in paragraph
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(c) shall be construed to prohibit the court from ruling upon the
petition based upon a dispositive motion.
(7) Temporary relief. If it appears that the person alleged
to be restrained will be removed from the court's jurisdiction or
will suffer irreparable injury before compliance with the hearing
order can be enforced, the court shall issue a warrant directing
the sheriff to bring the respondent before the court to be dealt
with according to law. Pending a determination of the petition, the
court may place the person alleged to have been restrained in the
custody of such other persons as may be appropriate.
(8) Alternative service of the hearing order. If the
respondent cannot be found, or if it appears that a person other
than the respondent has custody of the person alleged to be
restrained, the hearing order and any other process issued by the
court may be served on the person having custody in the manner and
with the same effect as if that person had been named as respondent
in the action.
(9) Avoidance of service by respondent. If anyone having
custody of the person alleged to be restrained avoids service of
the hearing order or attempts wrongfully to remove the person from
the court's jurisdiction, the sheriff shall immediately arrest the
responsible person. The sheriff shall forthwith bring the person
arrested before the court to be dealt with according to law.
(10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event that the
court orders a hearing, the court shall hear the matter in a
summary fashion and shall render judgment accordingly. The
respondent or other person having custody shall appear with the
person alleged to be restrained or shall state the reasons for
failing to do so. The court may nevertheless direct the respondent
to bring before it the person alleged to be restrained. If the
petitioner waives the right to be present at the hearing, the court
shall modify the hearing order accordingly. The hearing order shall
not be disobeyed for any defect of form or any misdescription in
the order or the petition, if enough is stated to impart the
meaning and intent of the proceeding to the respondent.
(d) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority.
(1) Who may petition the court; security. The attorney
general may, and when directed to do so by the governor shall,
petition the court for relief on the grounds enumerated in this
paragraph (d). Any person who is not required to be represented by
the attorney general and who is aggrieved or threatened by one of
the acts enumerated in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph (d) may
petition the court under this paragraph (d) if (A) the person
claims to be entitled to an office unlawfully held by another or
(B) if the attorney general fails to file a petition under this
paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petition
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filed by a person other than the attorney general under this
paragraph shall be brought in the name of the petitioner, and the
petition shall be accompanied by an undertaking with sufficient
sureties to pay any judgment for costs and damages that may be
recovered against the petitioner in the proceeding. The sureties
shall be in the form for bonds on appeal provided for in Rule 73.
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted:
(A) where a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office, whether civil or military, a franchise,
or an office in a corporation created by the authority of the state
of Utah; (B) where a public officer does or permits any act that
results in a forfeiture of the office; (C) where persons act as a
corporation
in
the
state of Utah without
being
legally
incorporated; (D) where any corporation has violated the laws of
the state of Utah relating to the creation, alteration or renewal
of corporations; or (E) where any corporation has forfeited or
misused its corporate rights, privileges or franchises.
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition,
the court may require that notice be given to adverse parties
before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order
requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on the merits.
The court may also grant temporary relief in accordance with the
terms of Rule 65A.
(e) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with
duty.
(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests
are threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph (e)
may petition the court for relief.
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted:
(A) where an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer
exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or
abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior court, administrative
agency, corporation or person has failed to perform an act required
by law as a duty of office, trust or station; or (C) where an
inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has
refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or office to
which the petitioner is entitled.
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition,
the court may require that notice be given to adverse parties
before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order
requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on the merits.
The court may direct the inferior court, administrative agency,
officer, corporation or other person named as respondent to deliver
to the court a transcript or other record of the proceedings. The
court may also grant temporary relief in accordance with the terms
of Rule 65A.
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(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are
judicial in nature, the court's review shall not extend further
than to determine whether the respondent has regularly pursued its
authority.
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company
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ADDENDUM B

FEB

4 199/

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF U T A | I
THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff,

ThAxd^fly&uxtt
(Jfal ,
Defendant.

Case No.
Count No.
Honorable
Clerk
T^/m
Reporter;
Bailiff.
Date'

D The motion of
to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant havmg^beon convicted by D a jury; D the court;Tl plea of guilty;
D plea of nOi6ontest; of the offense of ffi? Uld/ k i / 6 u / /
, a felony
of the # * o e g r e e t D a class
misdemeanor, being *row present in court and ready for sentence and
represented by^r^Jh
_ and the State being represented by Tfi KexJmf^ , is now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
L/

'Z

D
D
«
D
D
D
J9
D
D
D
D
D

years and which may be for life;
to a maximum mandatory term of.
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $.
to WfjwHL* /AJ&C
such sentence is to run concurrently with
such sentence is to run consecutively with
upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s)

(AJ

ujtg

are hereby dismissed.

Defendant is granted a stay of the above (G prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
D Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance^ with^this Ju/lflment and Commitment.
V Commitment shall issue _
DATED this

i^clay ofS^fM^A^19 3jL

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
DISTRICT COU
Defense Counsel

Deputy County Attorney
fMftiH*—Court)

fGreen—Judge)

Page
(Yellow—Jail/Prison/AP&P)

(Pink—Defense)

(Goldenrod—State)

of.

000003

ADDENDUM C

V
K

4

* «

Attorney Pro Se
Utah State Prison
f Q. ^SfrX ^ C )
(address)
fts^frfcJK, U * * ^CftP> (address)

L/

IN T H E " W ^ _ _ DISTRICT COURT, S«V;I W S _
STATE OF UTAH

COUNTY

W v ^ \.,U , Yft.\oVA
(name), *
Petitioner,
*
*
vs.
*

PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS AND POST
CONVICTION RELIEF

STATE OF UTAH,

*

Case No.

*

Judge

Respondent.

COMES NOW the Petitioner,

r

QimmQm ACL
..-- ~ — - ?---»• • > - r. » — •*...^

Wv.fr, VJE* Nhfr y*vT

(name),

pursuant to the following Rule of Civil Procedure (check only o n e ) :
X

Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule

65B(b)
65B(b)
65B(b)
65B(c)

since
since
since
since

claim
claim
claim
claim

is
is
is
is

based
based
based
based

on
on
on
on

original commitment, or
parole violation, or
probation violation, or
parole grant hearing,

and for cause of action alleges as follows:

1.

Petitioner is being illegally restrained at the following

location (list your address): V Q . ^o>x ^ C S
2.

Wvst^yWv.

Petitioner was convicted and sentenced at the following

Court: (list the district and county of the court or indicate that
it is a Board of Pardons hearing that you are challenging):

The dates of the proceedings in which the conviction (or Board of
Pardons decision) was entered are as follows:

^yA^Q
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF

The case number for these proceedings is:

not known; X

known

and is case number
3.

In plain and concise terms, all of the facts on the basis

of which the Petitioner claims a substantial violation of rights as
the result of the commitment (or terms of parole) are as follows:

CflfrftWlafek

4.

\V> TU*. hLfrCtts* V . ^ v AtvVSL Ett»k t C M M * P . U ^ l \ * t t

The

judgment

of

conviction

or

the

Cfffc*^

STCREK

commitment

for

violation of probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal.
Yes

X No

The number and caption or title of the appellate
proceeding and the results of the review are as follows:

It was not appealed becausefoTTVgxftaSJv^-^^ *;**•* *» thagnwrtc^

Question not applicable since this claim concerns a parole grant
2
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF
hearing for which there is no appeal or administrative remedy.
5.

The legality of the commitment for violation of probation

or parole or the legality of the parole grant hearing has been
reviewed on appeal.

Yes

No

If so, the reasons for the

denial of relief in the prior proceeding are as follows:

6.

Petitioner requests that he be appointed legal counsel

based on the attached motion and affidavit of impecuniosity.
7.

The

following

documents

are

attached

hereto

and

incorporated herein by reference (check all that apply):
X
X
X

Affidavits that support Petitioner's allegations
Copies of records that support Petitioner's allegations,
Other evidence that supports Petitioner's allegations
Copies of pleadings, orders and memoranda of the Court in
any other post-conviction or civil proceeding that
adjudicated the legality of Petitioner's commitment

8.

Petitioner was unable to obtain and attach the following

documents because

(list the efforts you made to obtain the

documents and the results of your efforts): ^fc_frfo\\\iCV»S^v

9.

That

pursuant

to DRCP Rules

65B(b)(12)

and

54(d),

Petitioner requests that this Court order the Respondent to obtain
such transcripts of proceedings or court records which are relevant
3
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF
and material to this case and requests that the county in which he
was originally charged be directed to pay the costs of the
proceeding.
10.

(See attached motion and affidavit of impecuniosity).

Due to the continuing nature of the illegal restraint,

the statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. §78-12-31.1
does not bar this action.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court:
1.

Schedule an evidentiary hearing at which time Petitioner

may be present and represented by counsel.
2.

Permit Petitioner, who remains indigent, to proceed

without prepayment of costs, fees or other assessments.
3.

Grant Petitioner the authority to obtain subpoenas in

Forma Pauperis, for witnesses and documents necessary to assist in
the proof of the facts alleged in the petition as stated above.
4.

Issue an Order for Post Conviction Relief to have the

Petitioner brought before it, to the end that he may be discharged
from the illegal and unconstitutional confinement and restraint.
5.

(other relief) \fryft \UL^CKIII % * W K

Dated this

\fr* day of ^JKKl^Jks^
TOVMA

v^tn^sftiAi^^^

199.JL.

$Ao NkAwJLhk fsion name)

x W ^ K W * Vfti^CTK
Attorney Pro Se

(print name!
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November 25, 1991
3rd District Court
c/o Judge Michael Murphy
2^0 East ^00 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Dear Sir:
I appeared in your court room for sentencing on February *l, 19^1 on the
charge of Retail Theft.
I respectfully request a printed transcript of my sentencing hear inn:. Also
at this time I would like to request a copy of my Judgement, Sentence, and
Committment, as soon as possible.
Please advise if there is a charge for this service, what that amount will
be, and approximately how long it will tu\:e to receive these documents after
receipt of the requested funds.
Respectfully,

David Hewitt, #13051
Oquirrh One
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 8*1020

0000C8

Cfjirtr district Court

December 2, 1991
David Hewitt, #13051
Utah State Prison
Oquirrh One
P. 0. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
Dear Mr. Hewitt:
Enclosed please find a copy of your Judgment, Sentence
and Commitment dated February 4, 1991.
I have conferred with the court reporter regarding the
transcript you have requested and this is her reply: The
Statutory transcript rate is $2.50 per page, which includes
an original filed with the Court and a copy to you. Upon
a deposit of $50.00, she will transcribe the hearing you
requested and notify you of the number of pages and amount
due. Make check or money order to Gayle Campbell.
Sincerely,

Alice
Front Office Clerk
for Judge Murphy

240 East 400 South / Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 / 801-535-5581

FEB

4 1991

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF U T A | I
THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff.

Case No.
Count No. -2L
Honorable
Clerk V*4tA

\JAdJL .
Defendant.

. to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
D The motion of.
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant havmg^eon conyicted by D a jury; D the court;** plea of guilty;
D plea of no;6ontest; of the offense of
*fct»Id// wwy/l
, a felony
of the ^ " r t e g r f t f i , D a class
misdemeanor, being w w present iir court and ready for sentence and
„ and the State being represented by < UJC4U
represented
by£s{Jh
., is now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison

T.

D
D
K
D
D
D
pB
D
D
D
D
D

years and which may be for life;
to a maximum mandatory term of
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $.
to ^UAAa^ fa'JboC
such sentence is to run concurrently with
such sentence is to run consecutively with
upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s)

(A<} UJtq

are hereby dismissed.

Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
D Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
Sf Commitment shall issue

-^/^(!<JA9iA^»
DATED this

7—

J ^ _ dav of\!Ze^t€M4^\9

3±-

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Defense Counsel

Deputy County Attorney
(White—Court)

(Green—Judge)

Page.
(Yellow—Jai»/Prison/AP4P)

(Pink—Defense)

(GokJenrod—State)

of.
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November 30, 1991
?rd District Court
c/o Judge Michael Murphy
P.no East ^00 South
Salt Lake City, Utah R4111
Dear Sir:
I aoDeared in your court room for sentencing on Februarv ^. 1-Q1 on the
charge of Retail Theft.
It has been brought to mv attention that an AP*P Resentencing p*?oort ^ s
preDared and presented to the court concerning my sentencing on this charge.
As of this date I have not had the opoortunity to review this resort and I
have r*ood reason to believe that this renort contains both erroneous and
misleading facts.
At this time I would like to request a copv of the APJ-^ ^resentencing Peport
2o that Z can review it for any misinformation that it may contain, and ret it
corrected by the Courts.
Thankinrr ycu in advance for vour time in this matter.
Respectfully,

Dave Hewitt
Oquirrh One
P.O. Pox 250
draper, Utah B14020
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CJjirir ©istrict Court
December 5, 1991
Dave Hewitt
Utah State Prison
Oquirrh One
P. 0. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
Dear Mr. Hewitt:
This letter is to inxorm you that after a person is
sentenced, the Presentence Report is destroyed. Therefore,
we won't be able to fulfill your reguest.
Sincerely,

•A&t
Alice
Front Office Clerk
for Judge Murphy

240 East 400 South / Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 / 801-535-5581
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\\\V , ^ Vs * W w ^ (name)
Attorney Pro Se
Utah State Prison
KY¥TYM ' ^ T i
(address 1
^k^fetK W SftCVACV a d d r e s s )

IN THE ~\WM>

WuK l »

Wuxrrr

DISTRICT COURT, S ^ g LfrvsSTATE OF UTAH

COUNTY

(name!. *

Petitioner,
VS.

*
*
*

MOTION FOR PREPARATION OF
TRANSCRIPTS AND COURT RECORDS
AND ORDER

*

STATE OF UTAH,

*

Case No.

^CAVyWsx

*

Respondent.

*

Judge VVguftfv. \*W>fr>U\,

Petitioner, W ^ v ^ VAP \\fr\^Tt

fname). attorney pro se,

does hereby move the Court, pursuant to Rule 65(B)(b)(12) and Rule
54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and based on the
accompanying Affidavit of Impecuniosity, to order Respondent to
obtain the transcript of the following proceedings or court records
which are relevant and material to this case (here list the records
you need): ftK^ S t ^ a m * * ^ ^frc*q. li^v..*,cag\* - y * ^ - * * ^ OV

and to direct the costs of the proceedings to the county in which
Petitioner was originally charged.
The transcripts/court records are relevant and material
to this case because (here give the reason that you need them):

000011

MOTION FOR PREPARATION OF TRANSCRIPTS AND COURT RECORDS AND ORDER
(continue explanation) taf m-AEiv ?M3t\ ^ ^ f e ^ ^ ^ "VQ ^\\*

DATED this

TftF* day of YSt^t^^K,

C<M^«X

199_\_.
(sion name)

^>v\m\ Vj-j

Utv^TvT

f p r i n t name)

Attorney Pro Se

ORDER
Petitioner having filed herein his motion for preparation
of transcripts and court records, and good cause appearing:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent shall obtain such
transcript of proceedings or court records which are relevant and
material to the case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the county in which Petitioner
was charged shall pay the costs of the proceedings.
DATED this

day of

, 199

.

BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
2
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BLEff DISTRICT COim!
Third Judicial District

JAN 2 2 1932
SALT LAKE COUNTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAVE HEWITT,

ORDER
CIVIL NO.

Petitioner,

901900931

vs.
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

Defendant
presentence
request

is

has

filed

report

and

denied

a motion

requesting

transcripts

and

the

of

denial

a copy

four
is

of his

hearings.

appropriate

The
when

considering the following chronology:
1.

Defendant was sentenced on February 4, 1991 and

did not prosecute an appeal therefrom.
2.

On November 25, 1991, he requested various court

papers and transcripts.
on

December

2,

The papers requested were referred

1991, along with

an explanation

of the

manner in which to acquire transcripts.
2.

On November 30, 1991 defendant requested a copy

of his presentence report.
replied

and

explained

On December 5, 1991, the court
that

presentence

reports

are

destroyed upon referral of a defendant to the State for
incarceration.

000013

HEWITT V. STATE

4.

PAGE TWO

ORDER

On December 11, 1991 defendant requested a docket

sheet and on December 17, 1991 the Court sent the requested
docket sheet.
The

Court

defendant's

has

been

requests.

completely

There

responsive

to

all

of

is no pending matter to which

defendant's request for transcripts relates and the Court has
complied with all other requests to the extent it has custody
of the requested items.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion is denied.
Dated this £?<*

day of January, 1992.

/ MltHAEL
M/PU:
R. MURPHY

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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PAGE THREE

HEWITT V. STATE

ORDER

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct .copy
of the foregoing Order,

to the following, this cPc2/Jaav

of

January, 1992:

Dave Hewitt
Pro se
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah

84020

Walter R. Ellett
Deputy County Attorney
Attorney for Respondent
231 East 400 South, Third Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

A*-
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ADDENDUM D

DAVID LEE HEWITT
ATTORNEY PRO SE
UTAH STATE PRISON
P.O. BOX 250
DRAPER, UTAH 84020

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DAVID LEE HEWITT,
PETITIONER,
VS.
STATE OF UTAH,
RESPONDENT.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS AND POST
CONVICTION RELIEF
CASE NO. 920900909
JUDGE MICHEAL R. MURPHY

COMES NOW TOE PETITIONER, DAVID LEE HEWITT PURSUANT TO THE FOLLOWING RULE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 65(b) SINCE TOE CLAIM IS BASED ON ORIGINAL COMMITMENT
AND FOR CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGES AS FOLLOW:
1. PETITIONER IS BEING ILLEGALLY RESTRAINED AT THE FOLLOWING LOCATION:
UTAH STATE PRISON, P.O. BOX 250, DRAPER, UTAH 84020.
2.

PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED SENTENCED AT THE FOLLOWING COURT: THIRD

DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY. THE DATE OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH THE
CONVICnON WAS ENTERED ARE AS FOLLOWS: 11/19/90

2/4/90

THE CASE NUMBER FOR THESE PROCEEDINGS IS CASE NUMBER 901900931
3. THE FACTS ON THE BASIS OF WHICH THE PETITIONER CLAIMS A SUBSTANTIAL
VIOLATION OF RIGHTS AS RESULT OF THE COMMITMENT ARE AS FOLLOWS:
A. THAT THE COURT RULED ON BOTH ERRONEOUS AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
INFORMATION IN DETERMINING THE PETITIONER'S SENTENCE. SUCH AS A
MISLEADING AP&P PRESENTENCING REPORT AND UNCOUNSELED CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS.
B. THAT THE COURTS ACCEPTED A PRESENTENCING REPORT FROM AN AP&P AGENT
WHOM NOT ONLY HAD A CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THIS CASE BUT ALSO WAS
PREJUDICIAL AND BIAS BEFORE PREPARING THE REPORT FOR THE COURT.
C. THAT THE COURT FAILED TO ASK PETITIONER IF HE HAD ACCESS TO REPORT
AND DID NOT EXPRESSLY INQUIRE WHETHER PETITIONER AND COUNSEL READ
AND DISCUSSED PRESENTENCE REPORT.
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AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST RELIEF

D. THAT THE COURT FAILED TO ASK PETITIONER IF EVERYTHING CONTAINED
IN THE REPORT WAS TRUE AND CORRECT.
E. THAT BOTH THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S
OFFICE CONSPIRED TO PRESENT BOTH ERRONEOUS AND MISLEADING INFORMATION
TO THE COURT AT THE TIME OF THE PETITIONER'S SENTENCING. THAT THE
COUNTY ATTORNEY DTD ATTACK THE PETITIONER'S CHARACTER AND CREDIBILrrY
WITH VINDICTIVE MALICE IN FACT.
F. THAT THE COURT STATED WHILE ON THE RECORD AND IN THE COURTROOM
ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE ANY RESTITUTION IN THIS
CASE AND THEN AFTERWARDS ORDERING SUCH IN THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCING
DOCUMENT.
4. THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION OR COMMITMENT HAS NOT BEEN REVIEWED ON
APPEAL BECAUSE OF THE PETITIONER LACK OF RESOURCES AND KNOWLEDGE OF LAW
PROCEDURES, LACK OF ACCESS TO LAW MATERIAL, AND INFORMATION, MISUNDERSTANDING
OF COURT INFORMATION, AND THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
5. PETITIONER REQUESTS THAT HE BE APPOINTED LEGAL COUNSEL BASED ON THE
ATTACHED MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUNIOSITY.
6. THE PETITIONER DID ATTACH SEVERAL LETTERS, ORDERS, AND MOTION TO THE
ORIGINAL PETITION AND HEREBY REQUEST THAT THEY ALL BE INCORPORATED INTO THE
AMENDED PETITION.
7. THAT PURSUANT TO URCP RULES 65(b)(12) AND 54(d), PETITIONER REQUESTS
THAT THIS COURT ORDER THE RESPONDENT TO OBTAIN SUCH TRANSCRIPTS OF PRCEEDINGS
OR COURT RECORDS WHICH ARE RELEVANT AND MATERIAL TO THIS CASE AND REQUESTS
THAT THE COUNTY IN WHICH HE WAS ORIGINALLY CHARGED BE DIRECTED TO PAY THE COSTS
OF THE PROCEEDING.
8. DUE TO THE CONTINUING NATURE OF THE ILLEGAL RESTRAINT, THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS SET FORTH IN UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-31.1 DOES NOT BAR THIS ACTION.
WHEREFORE, PETITIONER PRAYS THAT THIS COURT:
1. SCHEDULE AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AT WHICH TIME THE PETITIONER MAY BE
PRESENT AND REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
2.

PERMIT PETITIONER, WHO REMAINS INDIGENT, TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYMENT

OF COST, FEES OF OTHER ASSESSMENTS.
3. GRANT PETITIONER THE AUTHORITY TO OBTAIN SUBPOENAS IN FORMA PAUPERIS,
FOR WITNESSES AND DOCUMENTS NECESSARY TO ASSIST IN PROOF OF THE FACTS ALLEGED
IN THE PETITION AS STATED ABOVE.
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AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF

4. THAT ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSITUTIONAL SENTENCE BE VACATED AND SET ASIDE.
5.

ISSUE AN ORDER FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF TO HAVE THE PETITIONER

BROUGHT BEFORE IT, TO THE END THAT HE MAY BE DISCHARGED FROM THE ILLEGAL AND
UN CONSTITUTIONAL CONFINEMENT AND RESTRAINT.

DATED THIS j ^ D A Y OF

"AINV^

, 1992.

DAVID LEE HEWITT
ATTORNEY POR SE

000060

I dc hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the fceroinr was
nailed, oosta^e nre-oaid to the Attornev General's Office, at 6^00 .South ?.0f
East, Ste. 20'!, Salt'Lake City, Utah RU107 on this 17th day of June. 199°

W^

\A
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ADDENDUM E

>-•

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
DAVID F. BRYANT (5672)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
300 East 6100 South, Suite 204
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone; (801) 265-5638

-t

BY

:c

, ;,

Gf_

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DAVID LEE HEWITT,
MOTION TO DISMISS
Petitioner,
v.
Case No.

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

920900909 HC

Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Respondent, by and through David F. Bryant, hereby moves
this court to dismiss Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas
corpus because it is time-barred; raises claim which could and
should have been raised on appeal; fails to state a claim on which
relief can be granted, and fails to comply with the requirements of
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b).
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DATED t h i s

n£*

lay of March, 1992.

ttttD F. BRYAUT"
A s s i s t a n t Attorney

r
al

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the ID

day of March, 1992, I

caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing to
David Lee Hewitt, pro se, P.O.Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020.

•AiMhaW
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of

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
DAVID F. BRYANT (5672)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
300 East 6100 South, Suite 204
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 265-5638

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DAVID LEE HEWITT,
Petitioner,

:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO DISMISS

v.

:

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Case No.

:

Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Respondent.

920900909 HC

Respondent, by and through David F. Bryant, hereby
submits this memorandum

in support of its motion to dismiss

Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus.
ARGUMENT
Petitioner claims in his petition that he has suffered a
substantial denial of his rights in four areas.

He claims the

Adult parole and Probation agent who prepared his presentence
report was

"prejudicial."

He

further claims he

suffered a

substantial violation of his rights in that the court failed to ask
1

000023

him if he had access to the presentence report or whether he had
discussed it with his counsel. Additionally, Petitioner claims a
substantial violation of his rights in that the court failed to ask
him if everything in the report was true and correct.

Finally,

Petitioner claims a substantial denial of his rights in that the
court allegedly stated from the bench that no restitution would be
required, yet it was ordered in the written order sentencing
Petitioner.
POINT I
ALL OF PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ARE TIME-BARRED.
Although

Petitioner's

petition

provides

only

scant

information, it appears he was convicted on February 4, 1990. The
petition further states that there was no appeal of the conviction.
Petitioner did not file his post-conviction writ until February 11,
1992 —

some 24 months later.

Such a delay is well beyond the

three months allowed under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1. It states
in pertinent part:
Within three months:
For relief pursuant to a writ of habeas
corpus. This limitation shall apply not only
as to grounds known to petitioner but also to
grounds which in the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have been known by petitioner
or counsel for petitioner.
Petitioner's petition is approximately 21 months late.

He should

have known, through the "exercise of reasonable diligence" of any
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claims to be raided through post-conviction avenues.

Therefore,

even if this coutft were to decline to dismiss the petition on the
bases raised below, it must be dismissed because it is time-barred.
POINT II
PETITIONER'S PETITION SHOULD BE DISMISSED
BECAUSE HE COULD AND SHOULD HAVE RAISED
AliL HIS CLAIMS ON DIRECT APPEAL.
It is well-established that the post-conviction writ of
habeas corpus, "is not a substitute for and cannot be used to
perform the function of regular appellate review."
Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983).

Codianna v.

See also, Andrews v. Morris:

Rammel v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1979).
Consequently, Petitioner cannot raise issues in a habeas
proceeding that could or should have been raised on direct appeal.
In this case, Petitioner obviously knew after sentencing that the
alleged violations of his rights had occurred and he should have
appealed.
The Utah Supreme Court in Brown v. Turner, 440 P.2d 968
(Utah 1968), stated:
If the contention of error is something which
ig known or should have been known to the party at
tfte time the judgment was entered, it must be
reviewed in the manner and within the time permitted
by regular prescribed procedure, or the judgment
becomes final and is not subject to further attack,
except in some unusual circumstance. . . . [W]ere
it otherwise, the regular rules of procedure
governing appeals and the limitations of time
specified therein would be rendered impotent.
3
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Id- at 969.
Petitioner states in his petition that he did not appeal
because his counsel did not inform him the court had erred.

This

is likely because the court did not err, however, if Petitioner
desired an appeal, he should have requested his counsel pursue it.
Simply because Petitioner's counsel did not tell him the court had
erred when it did not, does not rise to the level of an "unusual
circumstance" contemplated by the Utah Supreme Court in Brown v.
Turner.
Because Petitioner cannot attack his conviction in the
absence of regular appellate review, this claim is barred and
should be dismissed.
POINT III
THE PETITION SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE
IT FAILS TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS
OF UTAH R. CIV P. 65B(b).
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(3)(iii) requires Petitioner to
state "all
a substantial

of the facts
violation

on the basis
of rightsf.]"

of which the petitioner

claims

Furthermore, Utah R. Civ. P.

65B(b)(4) mandates that a petition for post-conviction relief
include "affidavits, copies of the records, or other evidence" to
support the allegations.

Petitioner has failed to do so.

Petitioner claims, for example, that his presentence
report was prepared by a prejudicial agent.

Yet Petitioner does

4
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not support either his claim by explaining how the agent was
prejudiced.

Petitioner also claims, as enumerated above, that the

court committed other errors relating to asking Petitioner what
Petitioner

believes

presentence report.

to be required

questions

concerning

the

Petitioner fails to explain how or why the

court would be required to ask the questions he addresses in his
claims, or how the failure to ask them constitutes a substantial
violation of his rights.
Additionally, Petitioner claims the court at some point
stated from the bench that there would be no restitution ordered,
yet the court ordered restitution in the final written order.
However, Petitioner supports his claim with no documentation of any
kind.1

So, again there is failure to comply with the requirements

of Rule 65B(b).

Furthermore, even if Petitioner supported his

allegation, it is a well settled principle that "oral statements of
the trial court are superseded by written findings, judgment, or
verdict."

State v. Wade, 572 P.2d 398, 399 n.3 (Utah 1977),

overruled on other grounds, State v. Chavez, 605 P.2d 1226, 1227
(Utah 1979).

See also McCollum v. Clothier, 241 P.2d 468 (1952);

Park v. Jameson, 364 P.2d 1 (1961), and Drurv v. Lunceford, 415
P.2d

662, 662

(1966).

Therefore, that

claim must

also be

Petitioner's petition states there are documents attached to
the petition to support his allegations, however, there were no
attachments to the petition received by Respondent.
5
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dismissed.
Petitioner has made bare unsupported allegations and
provides absolutely no evidence to substantiate his claim.

This

being the case, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P 12(b)(1) and (6), the
petition should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that failure to follow the procedural requirements of Rule
65B(i) should result in dismissal of the case.

See e.g., Andrews

v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816 (Utah 1980). mandates that a petition for
post-conviction relief include "factual data constituting each and
every

manner

in

which

the

complainant

claims

that

any

constitutional rights were violated" and, additionally, mandates
that the complainant attach affidavits, copies of the records, or
other evidence to support the allegations.
CONCLUSION
In light of the fact that the statute of limitations has
expired; that Petitioner's petition raises claims which could and
should have been raised on appeal; fails to state claims on which
relief can be granted, and fails to comply with Rule 65B(b),
Respondent respectfully requests this court dismiss the Petition
for writ of habeas corpus.

6
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DATED this

/ *

ik day of March, 1992.
WTD F. BRYANT
Assistant Attorney

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

YSr^ day of March, 1992, I

caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing to
David Lee Hewitt, pro se. P.O.Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020.

UMrk^ihnU^
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ADDENDUM F

&

•

:

!

•

:

.

Tiv

David Lee Hewitt
Attorney Pro Se
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

MAR 3 0 1S32

IK THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUPT, SALT LA^E COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DAVID LEE HEWITT,
Petitioner,

vs.
STATE OE UTAH,
Respondent.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
Case No. 920900009
Jud^e Leslie A. Lewis

Petitioner, by and through himself, Pro Se, hereby moves this
the Court to deny Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. This request is based and
made because the Petitioner is within his ripht to file and have the courts
hear a petition for habeas corpus. The Petitioner has brought forth several
claims which are meritorious and has complied to the best of his ability with
the requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b).
Dated this 19th day of March, 1992.

W>A'&^^VV^L
David Lee Hewitt
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the fore^oin^ was
nailed, postage pre-paid to the Attorney General's Office, at 6100 South 300
East, Ste. 204, Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 on this 19th day of March, 199?.

W S l d^.Vv&s
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David Lee Hewitt
Attorney Pro Se
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah R4020

T

MAR 3 0 1392
Zy-CA

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
*
*
*

DAVID LEE HEWITT,
Petitioner,
vs.

«
*
*

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONER REOUESTS TO
DENY MOTION TO DISMISS
Case No. 920900909
Judre Leslie A. Lewis

Petitioner, by and through himself, hereby submits this
memorandum in support of Petitioner request to deny Respondent's Motion to
Dismiss.
ARGUMENT
Respondent claims that Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus
should be dismissed on three different points. Respondent claims that all of
Petitioner's claims are time-barred. Respondent further claims that
Petitioner's petition should be dismissed because Petitioner could and should
have raised all his claims on direct appeal. Additional, Respondent claims that
the petition should be dismissed because it fails to comply with the
requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b).
POINT I
ALL OF PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ARE TIME-BARRED.
Petitioner answers "nay"
In this point the Respondent uses and states Utah Code Ann. S 7R-1P-31.1.
Petitioner is completely uneducated in law procedures. The Petitioner does not
have the money nor the resources to properly research, attack, nor properly
file his grievance with the courts.

00003i

Petitioner did not know of the existence of a presentencing report, or the
right to review such until brought to Petitioner attention in Nov. 1991.
Petitioner would state that Utah Judicial Code 7*-12-31.1. Is constitutionally
incorrect when comparing it to the Constitution of The United States, Article I
Section 9(2), STre prlvtlegeTof' the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended,..., Constitution of the United States (Pill of Rights), Amendment I
the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Also the
Constitution of Utah (Declaration of Rights). Article I Section I - (Inherent
and Inalienable rights), protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of
grievances. Article I Section 5(Habeas Corpus), the privilege (of writ of
habeas corpus) shall not be suspended, unless in case of rebellion or invasion,
the public safety requires it. (emphasis added) In none of these, Article I
Section I and 5 or in the Constitution of the United States, Article I Section
9(2), and the first amendment of the Bill of Rights is there any mention of any
time limit in which these rights do and can apply. Petitioner also notes that
the Constitution of the United States and all Federal Laws are the supreme law
of the land. Additionally, because of the continuing violation of the
Petitioner rights, he should not be bound by the original three month time
limit in which to file.
POINT II
PETITIONER'S PETITION SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE HE COULD
AND SHOULD HAVE RAISED ALL HIS CLAIMS ON DIRECT APPEAL.
Petitioner answers "nay"
In this point Respondent mainly cites Brown v. Turner, M O P.2d 968(Utah
1968). Because of Petitioner lack of understanding law procedures, he relied in

-2-
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rood faith in his court appointed Public Defender. When the petitioner entered
a guilty plea to this charge and was told by the court that he was giving up
the right to an appeal. He presumed this to mean any and all appeals,
Petitioner did not have effective assistance of counsel during the procedures
of this court litigation or during the
sentencing phase of this process. Also if Petitioner would have knovm, which he
did not, he could have appealed the sentence, and then would have, but would
not have the appeal been a sham in lidnt of the defense Petitioner had already
received from his court aopointed attorney. Cites Dunn v. Cook 791 P.2d
B?3(Utah 199^). Had the attorney gone over the presentence report with
Petitioner and then discussed the consequences of the judgement against hin and
informed him of any meritorious grounds for an appeal or the right to an
appeal, this claim would not be in front of the Honorable Court right now.
However even with the Petitioner claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
during trial and then the sentencing, should not have the court shared some of
the resposibility to make sure that the Petitioner did have and was given at
least due process of his rights and of the law. Petitioner further cites in
part, Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 2B4, 431 P.2d 121(1967); Oallegos v. Turner,
17 Utah 2d 273, ^09 P,2d 386(1965).
POINT III
THE PETITION SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE IT FAILS TO COMPLY
WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH R. CIV. P.65B(b).
Petitioner answer wnayff
In this last point the Respondent primarily cites Utah R. Civ. P.
65B(b)(3)(iii). Prior to having this petition filed with the court, the
Petitioner did attach letters, a motion and order to and from the Third

-3-
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Tistrict Court, to the petition. Petitioner then gave everythinr to the
Contract Attorneys for then to make three copies of. Two for the court and one
for the Petitioner's filef then requested that they file the two complete
copies with the court. Petitioner received back his copy for his file and did
assume that his request had been completely followed through with.
Once arain Petitioner states that he is completely uneducated
in law procedures. The Petitioner does not have the money nor the resources to
pronerly research, attack nor file his grievances with the courts. Petitioner
has asked both the courts and the Dept of Corrections for copies of records,
documents, and affidavits so that he may fully address the courts with his
grievances, but so far has been turned down at both ends.
To address the issue that the Respondent brought up
concerning questions that should have been asked during the sentencing phase of
the court proceedings, Petitioner cites both U.S. v. Miller, and U.S. v. Pone.
In this case, as was the case of U.S. v. Miller, P49 F.2d 895, f W * t h Cir.
19BB), the opinion that the court stated was to remand for resentencing when
the court did not expressly inquire whether defendant and counsel read and
discussed presentence report and no evidence sunnorting inference that read
likewise in the case of U.S. v. Rone, 7^3 F. 2d 1159, 1173-74(7th Cir. 19 p 4),
the opinion of the court was to remand for resentencing when not clear that
defendant had access to report and court failed to ask defendant if he had read
report. Accordingly Fed* F. Crim. P. 32(a)(1)(A) and Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration Rule 4-203(2) both state Petitioner was entitled to the
presentencing report.
Additional the Respondent has stated on the claim of
restitution that "oral statements of the trial court are superseded by written
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findings, judgement, or verdicts.ff However the Petitioner did not take nor does
he believe the court intended the statement made by the trial judge that there
would be no restitution in this case, as an opinion or as an assurance but
rather as a ruling in this case, which would be constant with Utah Rules of
Judicial Administration Rule 6-302(2).
CONCLUSION
Vfherefore the Petitioner prays that the Honorable Court
allows the Petitioner to proceed and that the Court set a date for an
Evidentiary Kezrin?

pursuant to Arcicle I Section 11 of the Utah Constitution.
DATED this 19th day of March. 1992.

m\m^\^^

David Lee Hewitt
CERTIFICATE OF SFPVICE

I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was
mailed, postage pre-paid, to the Attorney Generalfs Office, at 6100. South 300
East, Ste. 204, Salt Lake City, Utah S4107 on this 19th day of March, 1992.

SES&A^&QL

\ftV^

000035

ADDENDUM G

FUB* DISTRICT C9U 1ST
"Tb'-vJ Judical D'ss*^ct

DEC 1 6 1992
Srki-l LAfvd ooy.n i Y
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SUMMARY DECISION AND ORDER

DAVID L. HEWITT,

CASE NO.

Petitioner,

920900909

vs.
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

Petitioner

makes

sentencing hearing:

these

allegations

of

error

at

his

(1) that the court allowed a biased agent

of AP&P to prepare the presentence report; (2) that the court
failed to ask petitioner if he had access to the report and
discussed

the

report

with his counsel;

(3) that

the court

failed to ask petitioner whether the presentence report was
accurate;
restitution

and

(4)

but

included

subsequent written
amended

petition,

that

the
a

court

failed

restitution

judgment.
the amended

to

orally

requirement

order
in

the

While petitioner has filed an
allegations do not alter the

thrust of his claims.
The fourth of these allegations is easily resolved.

The

petitioner is clearly and unequivocally wrong in his factual
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allegation.

PAGE TWO

SUMMARY DECISION

A transcript of the sentencing hearing indicates

the court expressly ordered restitution as part of its sentence.
The

other

allegations

characteristics:
hearing;

at

least

three

(1) they were not raised at the sentencing

(2) had they been raised they could have and would

have been addressed; and
direct

share

appeal.

As

a

(3) they were not the subject of a

consequence,

respondent's

waiver

and

statute of limitations arguments are persuasive.
The Court
920900797,

is now cognizant

which

the

of a separate petition, No.

petitioner

has

filed.

This

Summary

Decision and Order is not intended to resolve that petition.
The clerk has communicated to the respondent in that case that
it must respond to the petition as earlier ordered or risk
default.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed.
Dated this / ">

day of December, 1992.

MICHAEL R. MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

/
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PAGE THREE

HEWITT V. STATE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of

the

foregoing

following, this

Summary

Decision

and

Order,

to

the

I(p day of December, 1992:

David L. Hewitt
Pro se
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
Angela Micklos
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
300 East 6100 South, Suite 204
Murray, Utah 84107
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

"T^7vjWr
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526

SUPREME COURT OP U T A H

[Dec.

1923]

Taylor v. G. M. Co., 62 Utah 520
of the court. The action originally was upon promissory
notes. It is so alleged in the complaint under consideration v
A promissory note carries with it the presumption of a consideration. The defendant in the law action, appellant here,
filed a motion to strike certain parts of the complaint. The
court granted the motion. In the order it authorized the filing
of an amended complaint. Thereafter, without any new or
amended complaint being filed, the court entered judgment in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in that action. Every presumption is in favor of a judgment entered
by a court of general jurisdiction. This court is unable to
see any fallacy in the statement in the opinion that, in the
absence of any showing to the contrary, it must be presumed
that the complaint, after certain parts were stricken, contained the necessary allegation to constitute a cause of action.
The presumption indulged in favor of judgments carries with
it that implication.
The appellant invokes the aid of a court of equity to restrain the enforcement of that judgment without alleging any
facts showing that appellant had any defense, either equitable or legal, to the cause of action stated in the complaint in
the law action. The authorities are uniform that any one
asking the assistance of a court of equity to enjoin the enforcement of a judgment entered in a law action must, in the
complaint, state some fact or facts from which it can be reasonably inferred that to permit the enforcement of the judgment would be against good conscience and result in an injustice to the complaining party. This court attempted to
point out in its opinion that the complaint in the instant case
fails to state any such facts.
Rehearing denied.

SUPREME COURT OP UTAH

527

Habeas Corpus

ARESON v. PINCOCK,

Sheriff.

No. 4082. Decided December 1, 1923. #(220 Pac. 503.)
1.

BREACH OF THE PEACE—ELEMENT or FEAB NOT REQUIRED BY STAT-

UTE TO BE STATED IN COMPLAINT. Under Comp. Laws 1917, §f
8567-8570, 8575, providing for arrest and placing under security
to keep the peace, the element of fear that threats will be carried out is not required to be specifically stated in the complaint, but is to be concluded from facts laid before the magistrate as a prerequisite to issuance of the warrant.
2.

BREACH OF THE PEACE—PROOF OF THREATENED OFFENSE AND BELIEF OF COMPLAINANT NOT AS MATTER OF LAW INSUFFICIENT TO

AUTHORIZE WARRANT. It cannot be said as a matter of law that
sworn proof of a threatened offense and the belief of complainant that it will be carried into execution is insufficient to authorize a magistrate, to conclude that there is Just reason to
fear the commission of the offense for the purpose of issuing a
warrant to require security to keep the peace.
3.

HABEA8 CORPUS—DEFECTS OF JURISDICTIONAL CHARACTER TAKEN

COGNIZANCE OF BY HABEAS CORPUS. Habeas corpus takes cognizance only of jurisdictional defects which render a proceeding not merely voidable, but absolutely void.
4.

HABEAS CORPUS—QUESTION OF SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT IN PROCEEDING FOB SECURITY TO KEEP PEACE NOT ONE OF JURISDICTION.

The question whether the complaint in a proceeding to require
security to keep the peace was sufficient to state a cause of
action where it omitted to state that there was reason to fear
the commission of the offense threatened was not one of jurisdiction, and cannot be inquired into in habeas corpus proceedings.
5.

BREACH OF THE PEACE:—JUDGMENT IN PRESENT TENSE INSTEAD OF
AS TO TIME COMPLAINT FILED HELD SUFFICIENT. In proceeding

to require security to keep the peace, a judgment finding that
there is just reason to fear that defendant will carry into execution the threat made is not fatally defective because in the
present tense instead of aB of the time when complaint was
filed.
Original application by Nels Areson for writ of habeas
corpus against R. D. Pincoek, as sheriff of Weber County.
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Areson v. Pincock, 62 Utah 527
WRIT DENIED.

John G. Willis, of Ogden, for plaintiff.
D. J. Wilson, Co. Atty.,

of Ogden, for defendant.

CHERRY, J.
Upon the petition of Nels Areson, alleging that he was
illegally restrained of his liberty by the sheriff of Weber
county, a writ of habeas corpus was issued, to which the
sheriff made his return according to law.
The facts necessary to be considered are alleged in the
petition, and are not disputed. On June IS, 1923, Geo. F .
Fullmer filed a complaint before Hon. George S. Barker,
judge of the Second judicial district court, sitting as a
magistrate, charging Nels Areson, defendant (the petitioner
herein), with having made a series of specific threats of personal violence against him, on divers dates on and between
January 21, 1922, and June 6, 1923, and "that complainant
verily believes that unless said defendant is arrested and
placed under security to keep the peace that he will carry
out his threats against this complainant and others, for said
defendant is prepared to execute his threats unless restrained. "
A hearing was had before the magistrate on November
14, 1923, at the conclusion of which he found that "the
defendant has frequently tlireatened to inflict great bodily
harm upon the complainant, even to kill the complainant,
and it further appearing that there is just reason to fear
that said defendant will carry into execution the threats so
made," and ordered the defendant to enter into an undertaking in the sum of $2,000 to keep the peace, etc., or in
default thereof to be committed to the custody of the sheriff
to be by Mm imprisoned in the county jail until he give such
undertaking or is legally discharged.
The defendant failed to give the undertaking, whereupon
a commitment was issued pursuant to the order, and he was
imprisoned in the county jail of Weber county.

1923]
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The particular respects wherein it is claimed the restraint
is illegal are: (1) That the complaint is insufficient to state
a cause of action or to confer jurisdiction upon the court,
because it omits to state ' * that there is just reason to fear
the commission of the offense threatened"; that the statement in the complaint "that the complainant verily believes
that unless said defendant is arrested and placed under security to keep the peace he will carry out his threats," etc.,
is insufficient; and (2) that the finding of the magistrate
"that there is just reason to fear that defendant will carry
into execution the threats so made" is fatally defective because it is in the present tense, and relates to the time of
hearing, and fails to find that such fear existed at the time
complaint was made.
The proceedings had before the magistrate are authorized
by Comp. Laws Utah 1917, §§ 8567-8583, and the particular
matters here involved are governed by the following provisions :
Section 8567. "A complaint may be made before any magistrate that a person has threatened to commit an offense against the
person or property of another."
Section 8568. "The magistrate must examine on oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce, and may take their
depositions in writing."
Section 8569. "A complaint within the meaning of this chapter
Is a statement in writing of the jurisdictional facts, clearly specifying the threatened offense, and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant."
Section 8570. "If it appears that there is just reason to fear
the commission of the offense threatened, the magistrate may issue
a warrant directed generally to any peace officer, reciting the substance of the complaint and commanding the officer forthwith to
arrest the person complained of and bring him before such magistrate, or, in case of his absence or inability to act, before the nearest and most accessible magistrate of the county."
Section 8575. "If, however, there is just reason to fear the commission of the offense, the person complained of may be required to
enter into an undertaking in such sum, not exceeding $3,000, as
the magistrate may direct, with one or more sufficient sureties, to
keep the peace toward the people of this state, and particularly
toward the complainant. * * •"
It is thus seen that the element of fear is not required

530

SUPREME COURT OP UTAH

[Dec.

1923]

SUPREME COURT OP UTAH

531

Areson v. Pincock, 62 Utah 527

Habeas Corpus

by the statute to be specifically stated in the complaint, but is to be concluded by the magistrate from * 1
the facts laid before him, as a prerequisite to the issuance of the warrant. The whole matter is reduced to the
question of whether the showing made to the magistrate
was sufficient to authorize him to conclude that there was
just reason to fear the commission of the threatened offense.
We are not prepared to say as a matter of law that sworn
proof of a threatened offense, and the belief of complainant that it will be carried into execution, is in2
sufficient to authorize a magistrate to conclude that
there is just reason to fear the commission of the offense
threatened for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest.
But the question is not one of jurisdiction, and may not
be inquired into in habeas corpus proceedings. It cannot be
denied that the court had jurisdiction generally to try the
issues and make the order complained of. Habeas corpus
takes cognizance only of defects of a jurisdictional character, which render the proceedings not merely voidable, but absolutely void. Bruce v. East, 43 Utah,
3,4
327, 134 Pac. 1175. The rule is well settled and is
supported by many cases. See annotation to Ex parte Robinson, L. R. A. 1918B, 1148. The following excerpt from
the annotation above referred to indicates the extent to
which the rule is applied:

cases involving the sufficiency of complaints to charge misdemeanors, although probably the doctrine was not intended to be limited
to this class of cases, that after trial and conviction for an alleged
misdemeanor a prisoner will not be liberated on a writ of habeas
corpus because of the Insufficiency of the complaint, if, by any
possible construction of the language employed therein, an offense
against the law is thereby even defectively stated."

"It has been said that, if from the accusation the court can deduce that the prosecutor intended to charge an act which is a crime,
habeas corpus will not lie, however defectively the act is described;
also that if the indictment or information purports or attempts to
state an offense, and the court has jurisdiction to pass upon the
sufficiency of those statements, the defendants after conviction will
not be released on habeas corpus; and that, 'if a criminal charge
is colorable, or "sufficient to set the judicial mind in motion" or
to call upon it to act, or makes some approach towards charging a
criminal offense, or intimates the facts necessary to constitute the
offense and a purpose to declare thereon, or tends to show a criminal offense, no matter how informal or defective, or has a legal
tendency to prove each requirement of the statute, it will shield
the proceedings from collateral attack. In a word, no errors or
irregularities not going to the question of jurisdiction are reviewable on habeas corpus.' The rule has been laid down in several

In re Gregory, 219 U. S. 210, 31 Sup. Ct. 143, 55 L. Ed.
184, Mr. Justice Hughes, speaking for the court, in a case
where colorable questions were presented by the information
and evidence, stated the rule as follows:
"A habeas corpus proceeding cannot be made to perform the
function of a writ of error and we are not concerned with the question whether the information was sufficient or whether the acts set
forth in the agreed statement constituted a crime, that is to say,
whether the court properly applied the law, if it be found that the
court had jurisdiction to try the issues and to render the judgment."
The petitioner's objection to the complaint considered as
the basis of mere error is most hypercritical, and it is so^
unrelated to the subject of jurisdiction that it cannot be
considered at all in a habeas corpus case.
The second objection to the proceedings is even less meritorious. Counsel for petitioner has cited cases to the effect
that it is not a defense, or a ground for imposing costs upon
the complaining witness, to show that, notwithstanding there
were just grounds for fearing a breach of the peace
when the complaint was filed, the grounds for such
5
fear did not exist at the time of trial. State v. Sayer,
35 Ind. 379; State v. Steward, 48 Ind. 146; Stone v. State,
97 Ind. 345. No such questions arose in the proceedings
now under consideration, nor is it seen how these proceedings
give any support to the proposition that a judgment is void
because it is expressed in the present tense, instead of as
of the time when the complaint was filed. The objection is
groundless, and not worthy of further comment
The petition is denied, and the prisoner remanded to the
custody of the sheriff.
WEBER, C. J., and GIDEON, THURMAN, and PRICK,
JJ., concur.
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clerk of the district court of any county, and
there docketed, an execution may Issue thereon, and a Hen on the real property of the
judgment debtor Is created. When such an
abstract of a judgment is filed and docketed,
the district court of the county where filed
and docketed cannot, on motion, vacate the
judgment so transferred and docketed, and
strike the abstract from the record, unless it
appears on the face ot the abstract that the
Judgment is void. The docketing of the Judgment In the office ot the c/erk of Utah county
did not give the district court of that county
jurisdiction of the action in which such judgment was rendered. The docketing of the
Judgment was for the purpose of creating a
lien upon the j e a l estate of the judgment
debtor, and enforcing the same by execution.
If an execution is issued which does not foltow the judgment as docketed, the court undoubtedly has power, on motion, to recall or
quash it. But such motion would not reach
any defect in the judgment not shown upon
the face of the record. The court, however,
was not authorized to go behind the face of
the abstract and to determine whether the
justice rendering the judgment had jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, or to inquire into the merits of the cause. If the
judgment rendered in the justice court is
erroneous or void for want of jurisdiction,
not appearing on the face of the abstract, relief therefrom must be obtained in some other manner authorized by law or equity.
We are therefore of the opinion that the
district court was not authorized, on motion,
to inquire into the matters presented to it,
or to strike the abstract from the record.
The following cases fully support the views
herein expressed and the conclusion reached
by us: 23 Cyc. p. 893; Garlock v. Calkins, 14
S. D. 90, 84 N. W. 393; Btrdsey v. Harris, 68
N. C. 9 2 ; Whitehurst v. Transportation Co.,
109 N. C. 342, 13 S. E. 937; Lacock v. White,
19 Pa. 495; Llttster v. Littster, 151 Pa. 474,
25 Atl. 117.
The order of the district court canceling
and vacating the docketing of the abstract
of judgment is therefore annulled, and the
docketing of the abstract restored. No costs
are allowed against the district judge;
but
inasmuch as the defendant, Ellen Ivers, applied for the order canceling the docketing
of the abstract, maintained and prosecuted
her motion therefor before the district court,
and defended the same in this court, the
plaintiff is entitled to costs of this proceeding to be taxed against her.
McCARTY, C. J., and FRICK, J., concur.

WINNOVICH v. EMERY.
(Supreme Court of Utah. Feb. 3, 1908.)
t. HABEAS CORPUS—NATURE OF PBOCEEDINO
— C I V I L OB CRIMINAL.

Habeas corpus proceedings are civil, and
not criminal.

(l>tuh.

2. SAME—SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS.

Habeas corpus belongs to what, under IfcJ
Code, are termed "special proceedings." • V?3
3. SAME—APPEAL.

W-M

Rev. St. 1898, $ 3G27, provides that a paS
ty prosecuting a special proceeding may ba
known as plaintiff, and the adverse party as dV
fendant. Section 3303 provides that any party
to a judgment muy appeal therefrom, and that
the party appealing shall be known as appeflant, and the adverse party as respondent
Held, that a proceeding in habeas corpus being
civil, the applicant is the plaintiff and the party
who restrains the applicant is the defendant;
and therefore an appeal by defendant m not ah.
attempted appeal by the state.
, .. ^
4. APPEAL AND EBEOB—DECISIONS R E V I E W * !
BLE— "FINALITY OP JUDGMENT."
fc«i

The test of finality for the purpose of an
appeal is not necessarily whether the whole
matter involved in the action is concluded, but
whether the particular proceeding or action is
terminated by the judgment
i ^
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent Dir.1
vol. 2, Appeal and Error, §§ 426-443.
'*M
For other definitions, see Words and Phrase*!
vol. 3, p. 2777; vol. 8, p. 76C3.J
^
5. HABEAS CORPUS—APPEAJL—DECISIONS
VIEWABLE—FINALITY.

R*-j
. *$

In a habeas corpus proceeding, the jndg?
ment of the court which either remands or dUt-i
churges the petitioner is a final judgment, notwithstanding the fact that another similar proceeding may be commenced by the petitioner if
he elects to do so.i
-A«
6. SABrs—EFFECT—STAY OF PROCEEDING.

?Jj

Without an express statutory provision to!
that effect, an appeal does not of its own fores
suspend the judgment in a habeas corpus proceeding.
i£
N
7. SAME—GBOUNDS FOB RELIEF.

' "}ty

Where the common law is in force or under statutes which are in effect merely declaratory of the common law, courts, on habeas cor-,
pus, may not extend the investigation beyond
jurisdictional matters.
, i.^jj
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent Dig.)
vol. 25, Habeas Corpus, f 23.]
8. SAME—REVIEW OB EVIDENCE.

,.>.*!

There is no statutory authority in this state
whereby a court or judge on habeas corpus may'
review the evidence adduced before a magistrate
in support of a criminal charge for the purpose
of determining whether the evidence was either
competent or sufficient to warrant the magistrate in holding the accused for trial to the'
district court and in committing him for that
purpose.
...J
9. SAME.

'

,?

If the accused should allege and offer to
prove that the magistrate did not in fact hear
any evidence in support ot the charge, and the
accused did not waive examination, and that the
record showing the proceedings of the magis-'
trate is false, then the court or judge in habeas
corpus proceedings should hear the evidence in
that regard; and, if it is found that there was
no preliminary examination by the magistrate,
the accused should be discharged.
Appeal from District Court, Third District;
Geo. G. Armstrong, Judge.
Habeas corpus by Emil Winnovich against
C. Frank Emery. From a judgment discharging petitioner, defendant appeals. Reversed.
Willard Hanson and Thos. Marioneaux, for
appellant. P. P. Christensen, for respondent
» Mead •. Metcalf, 7 Utah. 103. 26 Pac 729; In r«
Clasby, 3 Utah, 183. 1 Pac. 852; Honerfne M. & AC.
Co. v. Tallerday Steel P. ft T. Co., 80 Utah, 449, 86
Pac. 626.

_.TRICK, J. On th<2 loth day of June, 1907, j
& complaint in due form was filed before Joseph J. Williams, a justice of the peace of
Sgalt Lake county, charging Emil Winnovich,
Khe respondent In this appeal, with the crime I
lof murder. He was duly arrested upon a I
Warrant, and taken before said justice, who I
^regularly proceeded to examine Into the I
febarge, and on the 18th day of June, 1907, I
F*fter hearing the evidence adduced thereon, I
Ifoond that there was probable cause to bejlleve that the accused, Emil Winnovich, had
Committed the crime of murder, and entered I
ian order .or judgment requiring the accused I
rtn appear before the district court of Salt
}Lake county, and to that end issued a mit- I
^tlmus or commitment directed to the sheriff
gof Salt Lake county, the appellant herein, to
•safely keep said accused and bring him bef o r e the district court of Salt Lake county to
the dealt with according to law. The appell a n t accordingly held the respondent In custody In the common jail of Salt Lake county
t>y virtue of said commitment On the 26th
liiay ot June, 1907, the respondent presented
.bis petition to George G. Armstrong, one of
the district judges of Salt Lake county,
wherein be alleged that be was unlawfully
restrained of his liberty, and prayed that a
writ of habeas corpus issue requiring appellant to show cause why he detained the respondent and restrained him of his liberty.
Appellant duly produced the respondent in
court as directed by said writ, and for cause
ot detention produced the commitment issued
as aforesaid. On the 29th day of June fol- I
lowing the petition was submitted to Said I
-district judge, sitting as a court, without ar~ I
.-gument The evidence adduced at the hearing before the justice, duly certified to by
him, was submitted to the court, together
with the return of appellant as aforesaid.
On the 9th day of July, 1907, the court gtant•ed the petition of respondent, upon the sole
ground, as appears from the record, that °it
does not appear to the court that there la
sufficient evidence in the record to warrant
the holding of defendant" The court accordingly entered an order or judgment discharging the respondent from the custody of appellant, and restored respondent to liberty.
From the order or judgment, Emery appeals.
A motion to dismiss the appeal is interposed by respondent upon the grounds (1)
that this Is in effect an appeal by the state,
and that the state has not the right to appeal
1n such a proceeding; (2) that, in any event,
no appeal lies from habeas corpus proceedings
In this state because the order or judgment
•of discharge Is not a final judgment
We will first examine into the first ground
urged why this appeal should be dismissed,
namely, that an appeal in this case is an appeal by the state. This brings op the question whether the proceedings are civil or
criminal. We think there is little, If any,
room for doubt) In view of the authorities,
that the proceedings are civil, and not crlm- |

lual. The purpose is to protect ui viuujiu..,
a civil right The person is restrained of bis
liberty, and the purpose of the whole proceeding Is to have that liberty restored to him at
the earliest possible moment When liberty
is restored, the proceeding has accomplished
Its purpose, and no other or further consequences follow. That habeas corpus proceedings are civil, and the reasons why they are
so, are well stated by Mr. Chief Justice
Walte in E x parte Tom Tong, 108 U. S. 359,
2 Sup. C t 872, 27 L. Ed. 826, where he says :
**The writ of habeas corpus is the remedy
which the law gives for the enforcement of
the civil right of personal liberty. Resort
to it sometimes becomes necessary, because
ot what is done to enforce laws for the punishment of crimes, but the judicial proceeding under it is not to inquire into the criminal act which is complained of, but Into the
right to liberty notwithstanding the a c t Proceedings to enforce civil rights are civil proceedings, and proceedings for the punishment
of crimes are criminal proceedings. In the
present case the petitioner is held under
criminal process. The prosecution against
him is a criminal prosecution, but the writ
of habeas corpus which be has obtained is
not a proceeding in that prosecution. On the
contrary, it is a new suit brought by him to
enforce a civil right which he claims, as
against those who are holding him in custody
under the criminal process. If be tails to
establish his right to his liberty, he may be
detained for trial for the offense; but, if he
succeeds, he must be discharged from custody. The proceeding is one Instituted by
himself for his liberty, not by the government
to punish him for his crime." In Cross v.
Burke, 146 U. 8. 88, 13 Sup. C t 24, 36 L. Ed.
896, Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, In passing upon the question, says: "It is well settled
that a proceeding In habeas corpus is a civil,
and not a criminal, proceeding." In support
of this, he cites Farnsworth v. Montana, 129
U. S. 104, 9 Sup. Ct. 253, 32 L. Ed. 616;
Kurtz v. Moffltt, 115 U. S. 487, 6 Sup. Ct. 148,
29 L. Ed. 458, and the Tong Case, above
quoted from. We desire also to call special
attention to the case of Ex rel. Durner v.
Huegin, 110 Wis. 189, 85 N. W. 1046. In the
case last referred to, as In this, the sheriff
took the proceedings to the Supreme Court
for review from an order or judgment by the
lower court discharging the prisoner. That
case Is one of the best considered cases we
can find upon the subject, and, as it so completely covers the whole ground with regard
to habeas corpus proceedings, we refer the
reader to that case. In re Foye, 21 Wash.
250, 57 Pac. 825, In re Baker, 21 Wash. 259,
57 Pac. 827, and In re Sylvester, 21 Wash. 263,
57 Pac. 829, are also cases In which the
nature of the proceedings, the right of appeal, and kindred questions are discussed.
Moreover, section 4510, Rev. S t 1898, defines a criminal action thus: "The proceedings by which a person charged with a public
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offense la accused and brought to trial and | and the adverse party ae respondent I t alsU
punishment, la known as a criminal action." provides that the title of the action or pro?
The section following provides that such ac- ceedlng is not changed by an appeal. FronJ
tions shall be prosecuted In the name of the all this It seems clear t o us that a proceedstate of Utah as a party against the person ing in habeas corpus is civil, that the appui
charged with the offense, who, the next sec- cant is the plaintiff and the party who re-*
tion provides, shall be designated as defend- strains the applicant i s the defendant, and
ant. The person charged, therefore, is pros- t h a t on appeal, the o n e w h o appeals is the
ecuted by and in the name of the state. appellant, and the other the respondent!!
While in Borne proceedings. In their nature From this it follows that in this case no ap5
civil, the name of the state may also be used, peal Is attempted by the state, but the ap-*
this in habeas corpus proceedings, as w e hope peal is taken and prosecuted by the sheriff^
to make clear, is wholly unnecessary and of C. Frank Emery, the appellant who, it was1
no importance.
claimed in the petition for a writ of habeas1
Having thus established that a proceeding corpus, unlawfully restrained the respondent
in habeas corpus is civil, what is Its char- of his liberty. The appeal, therefore, should
acter under our system of procedure? Is i t a not be dismissed upon the first ground. r , •
s u i t an action, or may it be classed as a
Can the appeal stand a s against the second
special proceeding? It seems to us that ground urged? It is asserted that the dethere can be no doubt that it belongs to what, cisions of this court in Mead v. Metcalfe 7
under the Code, are termed "special proceed- Utah, 103, 25 Pac. 729, and In re Clasby, 8
ings.'* This Is also the conclusion reached Utah, 183, 1 Pac. 852, are decisive of this
by the courts who decided the cases above question. It Is true that In Mead v. Metcited, as well a s the conclusion reached by calf this court held that an order or judgmany other courts. The conclusion is rein- ment discharging a prisoner upon habeas corforced by the fact that the writ of habeas pus is not a final judgment from which an
corpus, well known to the common law, did appeal will He; and it w a s further held in
not receive the respect from the common-law both cases referred to that no appeal is percourts Its importance merited, and for that missible In any event In habeas corpus proreason It w a s made more effective in the ceedings. Since those cases were decided the"
reign of Charles II by what Is known as the territorial government has been merged into
"Habeas Corpus A c t " Since then, to a a state government, and the right of an aplarge extent, It has been and now Is regu- peal is fixed in the Constitution of the state,
lated by statute. 21 Cyc. 283. In modern which, so far as material here, Is found in
times habeas corpus may, therefore, be con- section 9 of article 8, which provides: "From
sidered as a statutory proceeding, although it all final judgments of the district courts,
had its origin in the common law. Under there shall be a right of appeal to the Suthe statute it may well be classed as a spe- preme Court The appeal shall be upon the
cial proceeding. If it is, w h o are the par- record made In the court below, and under
ties to such a proceeding? In referring to such regulations as may be provided by law."
our Code we find that section 3627, Rev. St. The right of appeal, therefore. Is a constitu1898, provides as follows: "The party pros- tional right which cannot be interfered with
ecuting a special proceeding may be known as by the Legislature. Under the l a w In force
the plaintiff, and the adverse party as the de- when the two Utah cases above referred to>
fendant" Who prosecutes in a habeas corpus were decided the statute likewise permitted
proceeding? It is either the person restrain- an appeal from final judgments. Iff thereed of his liberty, or some one In his behalf. fore, a judgment in a certain proceeding w a s
He Institutes the proceeding the same as he not final under the territorial statute, it
does any other, without leave from any one. would seem that, for the same reasons, it
Against whom is it directed? Against the will not be final under the Constitution. In
person alone w h o deprives the applicant of view that the territorial court has directly
his liberty. W e thus have one who com- passed upon the question, and for the reason
plains of some illegal act or acts attributed that the authorities are in hopeless conflict
to another. W e thus have a plaintiff. The I upon the question, w e should n o t under orperson agains't whom the illegal acts are al- I dinary circumstances, be inclined to reconleged Is the defendant The terms "plain- sider the question, but would feel constrained
tiff" and "defendant," therefore, are as prop- to abide by the decisions of the territorial
er and as applicable In a habeas corpus pro- Supreme Court of which this court is the
ceeding as they are In any other special pro- successor. The ruling, however, that a judgceeding. The plaintiff seeks to vindicate a ment In a habeas corpus proceeding Is not
legal right. The defendant opposes plain- final Is based In those cases upon the ground
tiff's claims. That both claim under a spe- that such a judgment Is not res adjudlcata,
cial law cannot affect the matter one w a y or and hence does not prevent a further proanother. B y section 3303, Rev. St. 1898, It ceeding of the same character In the same
is provided that any party to a judgment court or before the same judge, or In another
may appeal therefrom; that on appeal the court, or before another judge having jurisparty appealing shall be known a s appellant I diction of the subject-matter. This may alt
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oe granted; and y e t tt does not follow that I special statute or by constitutional provision.
a judgment which does not finally estop a This argument is based upon the theory that
party to it from proceeding again in the same to permit appeals In habeas corpus proceedmanner Is not, for the purpose of an appeal, ings destroys the effectiveness of the remedy;
"a final judgment This has been decided so that it may delay the party In obtaining his
often that It has become elementary. This liberty, the very thing that by habeas corpus
'court, in a later decision entitled Honerine was intended to be speedily restored to him.
jf. & M. Co. v. Tallerday Steel P. & T. Co., It is urged that, if appeals are permitted,
SO Utah, 449, 85 Pac. 626, has so held. Mr. then the judgment of the court discharging
justice Straup, a t page 451 of 30 Utah, page the prisoner must be suspended, and the
62G of 85 P a c , states the rule in this regard very purpose of the writ Is defeased. This
tersely and correctly in the following lan- argument or conclusion, to our minds, asguage: "It is the termination of the particu- sumes that to follow which does not follow.
lar action which marks the finality of .the Without an express statutory provision to
judgment A decision which terminates the that effect an appeal does not of its own
guit, or puts the case out of court without force suspend the judgment in a habeas coran adjudication o n . t h e merits, is neverthe- pus proceeding. 21 Cyc. pp. 338-341. Even
less a final judgment." This doctrine is sup- in those states where an express right of an
ported by many cases, some of which are appeal is given by statute, the courts have
cited by Mr. Justice Straup and need not held that the taking of an appeal does not
again be cited here. If this were not so, It suspend the judgment State v. Kirkpatrick,
would not be permitted to appeal from a j 54 Iowa, 373, 6 N. W. 588.
judgment granting an involuntary nonsuit,
But this question is not Involved in this
because the judgment in such a case does case, and w e therefore express no opinion
not estop the plaintiff from prosecuting an- upon i t except to suggest that such a result
other action for t h e same cause of action. does not necessarily follow from the allowThe test of finality for the purpose of an ap- ance of an appeal, and therefore that it is
peal, therefore, is not necessarily whether not a conclusive reason or argument against
the whole matter Involved in the action Is the allowance of appeals In such proceedings.
concluded, but whether the particular pro- Nor is the further reason that a habeas corceeding or action Is terminated by the judg- pus proceeding m a y be commenced in this
ment. If it is, and, in order to proceed far- court and thus make an appeal unnecessary
ther with regard to the same subject-matter, of much force. If this reason applies to
a new action or proceeding must be com- habeas corpus proceedings, It should also apmenced, then, as a general rule, the judg- ply to proceedings of mandamus, prohibition,
ment which ends the particular action or certiorari, and quo warranto, all of which
proceeding is final for the purposes of an ap- may be originally commenced In this court
peal, If an appeal Is permissible at all. Both We think no one would seriously contend that
of the Utah cases referred to have thus been for that reason no appeal should be permitted
greatly weakened with regard to the doc- j to this court from the judgment of the distrine of finality of judgments by what is trict court entered in any one of the special
said In the Honerine Case. Nor can the doc- proceedings referred to. B u t let us examine
trine, a s It is stated to be in the Honerine a little farther into the assumption that an
Case, be successfully assailed. We are con- appeal in effect would destroy the effectivestrained to hold therefore that In a habeas ness of the writ of habeas corpus under our
corpus proceeding the judgment of the court law as it is now in force. For this purpose,
which either remands or discharges the pe- it must be conceded that, if a judgment of
titioner is a final judgment, notwithstanding discharge Is not final, then a judgment rethe fact that another similar proceeding may fusing a discharge and remanding the prisonbe commenced by the petitioner if he elects er cannot be so. What, then, would be the
to do so. If this conclusion be sound, then result In view of our present law upon the
it would seem logically to follow that, under subject of habeas corpus proceedings? This
our Constitution, where the right of appeal law has been materially changed since the
Is given from all final judgments, this court decisions of Mead v. Metcalf and In re Clashas no power to deny the right, but must per- by were announced. Section 1009, Rev. St.
mit the exercise thereof In all cases and pro- 1898, which took effect on January 1, 1898,
ceedings.
with regard to what the petition In a habeas
corpus proceeding must contain, in substance
It Is argued that, although the language of provides that It must state the name of the
a constitutional provision or a statute be person who detains the petitioner and the
such as would authorize or confer the right place where detained; the cause of restraint,
of appeal generally, in view that the policy and that It is illegal; that the legality of the
of the law with regard to appeals in habeas Imprisonment has not already been adjudged
corpus proceedings is opposed to the exercise upon a prior proceeding of the same charof the right, therefore appeals in such pro- acter, and whether the application for the
ceedings should not be permitted by the writ has been before made to and refused hy
courts under general provisions, but only I any court or judge, and, if so, to attach a
when the right to an appeal Is given by a
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copy of the petition and the reasons of the
refusal to the petition. Section 1077 provides
that any court or Judge disallowing a writ
must append bis reasons therefor to the petition, and return both to the applicant. The
petition must be verified. The statements
that the legality of the petition has not been
already adjudicated and the refusal of a
former application are both essential, and
without them the petition does not contain
the necessary statements authorizing the issuance of the w r i t If this be so, what is the
natural effect of such statements? As it
seems to us,- it naturally must result in imposing restrictions upon petitioner in making
successive applications. Is it not manifest
that, if a petition is presented to one court
or Judge which shows upon its face that
another court or Judge of the same or higher
grade has already passed upon the Identical
questions involved, In nine out of ten cases
the court or Judge would therefore decline
to issue a new writ, or, if he did, would likely follow the Judgment In the prior case unless something new was made to appear?
This in its practical effect, In most cases,
would result in but one application. If no
right of appeal is given, we would thus have
the very thing which, in the minds of some
of the courts, has been In the way of an appeal also stand in the way of successive applications. But there are still other reasons.
Suppose a person applies for a writ which is
allowed, and a hearing bad upon it. Upon
the hearing the court refuses a discharge
from the restraint, regardless of what the
cause of such restraint may be. To this the
court in the case of Mead v. Metcalf and some
of the other courts make answer that the
applicant for the writ can apply again; that
he may even come to this court and make a
new application, and he may continue this
until he finds some court or judge who feels
more favorably Inclined to grant his request
But such an applicant and all of his witnesses
may be hundreds of miles distant from this
court, and, In view of our judicial districts
being large, may be a great distance from
any other judge or court. Moreover, he may
have presented his whole case In which the
facts are entirely undisputed, and the whole
question may be one of law merely. Must
be, then, In order to obtain the judgment of
this court upon the law, institute a new
proceeding somewhere, and produce all of
his witnesses or take their testimony by the
expensive and often unsatisfactory method of
depositions, when he already has it In another
form. May not the inconvenience and costs
thus entailed upon him result in preventing
another application upon the same state of
facts when by a simple appeal with a bill of
exceptions containing the evidence and ruling
of the court he can obtain the Judgment of
this court with respect to the legality of his
detention? This, it seems to us, Is strictly
in furtherance of the policy of the law which
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alms to make the writ effective, and the final
result to be gained by it as speedy as pogJ
sible. Upon the other band, let us assume a
case where the person charged with a crime
makes the application and is given a hear*
Ing on which the district court discharge!
him upon a point of law. The officer having
him in charge may have In his custody a
number of persons charged or contemplated
to be charged with the same or some other
crime, but ail involving the same question of
law. He thinks the district court erred in his
decision in discharging the first applicant If
there is no appeal, the judgment of the district court granting the discharge certainly Is
final so far as that charge is concerned, and
the officer of the law cannot proceed farther
with that or any other case involving the
same legal questions, unless he could have the
law distinctly and authoritatively settled by
the highest court If this court agrees with
the district court, no one Is or can be harmed.
If, upon the other hand, it does not so agree,
and holds that, under the law, the detention
was just and proper, then, again, no one is
legally injured. It needs no argument that it
is just as important to enforce the laws
against criminals as it is to enforce them In
favor of liberty and against illegal restraint
It is by a strict enforcement of all the laws
that liberty Is best protected. In view of the
foregoing, is it not reasonably certain that
the exercise of the right of appeal is not
against the policy of the law which alms at
making the writ of habeas corpus effective?
And it In no way retards the speedy determination of the application. The argument
or reason, therefore, fails that an appeal
should not be allowed in such proceedings.
If an appeal is in harmony with the ultimate
object and purpose of the writ, and tends
to facilitate, rather than hinder, both the
applicant and the officers of the law in establishing legal rights, is there any reason
left why a court should resort to nice distinctions and strained constructions to avoid
appeals in such proceedings? In what we
have said we do not wish to be understood as
holding that an appeal lies from a mere refusal to grant the w r i t Many courts where
the right of appeal Is expressly given by statute deny the right of an appeal from a mere
refusal to issue a w r i t But upon this question, like upon nearly all others In habeas
corpus proceedings, the courts differ. 21 Cyc.
340, notes 31, 33. As the question is not involved in this case, however, we express no
opinion upon It. We think the question with
regard to appeals in habeas corpus proceedings, in view of the provisions of law In force
in this state, should be treated precisely as
such a question would be treated with respect to all other actions or proceedings. In
view of what we have said, and for the reasons that a departure from the doctrine announced in Mead v. Metcalf and In re Clasby
will in no way interfere with, or In any
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iway involve, property rights, nor disturb any
rights that could have beea acquired thereunder, we have less hesitancy in overruling
•those cases In so far as the conclusions herein
.reached are in conflict with them. It follows, therefore, that the motion to dismiss
must be denied.
This brings us to the merits of the case.
It appears from the record and judgment of
the district court that the respondent was
discharged upon the sole ground that, in the
opinion of the court, the evidence adduced at
the preliminary hearing was insufficient to
show probable cause to believe that respondent was guilty of the crime charged. It is
clear, therefore that the district court undertook to determine from the evidence whether there was probable cause or not Did the
court have the legal right to do this in a
habeas corpus proceeding? Upon this question, again, the courts are not in harmony.
As a general rule, the courts hold that on
habeas corpus, In the absence of a statute
conferring the right, the courts cannot go into the evidence adduced before the magistrate, but must confine the inquiry to questions of jurisdiction, and, if it be found that
the magistrate had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the person of the defendant,
that the complaint stated an offense and a
hearing was had upon the charge and the mittimus under which the accused Is held Is regular, and that the magistrate acted within bis
jurisdiction, then the court may not discharge
the prisoner. Some courts, under statutory
provisions, have held that the court may, on
habeas corpus, determine whether the accused
•hould be held upon the evidence, and may
even hear additional evidence. A distinction
Is also made with regard to the time an application for the writ of habeas corpus Is
made. If made before an indictment is returned, the powers of the court to examine
Into the evidence are greater than after indictment found. 21 Cyc. pp. 324-527, where
the authorities are collected, and the different views of the courts stated In the notes.
The diversity of opinion is, however, more
apparent than real. It arises out of the different statutory provisions applicable to habeas corpus proceedings. In habeas corpus
proceedings instituted for the purpose of voiding a commitment Issued by an examining
magistrate many states have enacted statutes
which enlarge the powers of the judges or
courts In passing upon the legality of the
commitment It Is under such statutes that
courts sometimes examine Into the facts adduced before the magistrate and the • preliminary examination held by him for the
purpose of determining whether the evidence
Is sufficient to warrant the holding of the accused who has been committed by the magistrate Into the custody of the officer. In the
absence of such special statutes, however, the
courts on habeas corpus have not the power
to review the evidence heard by the magis03F-63
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crate, and pass upon its sufficiency to authorize the holding of the accused. The controlling principles are well stated by Judge Cooley In his excellent work on Constitutional
Limitations (7th Ed.) p. 495, where he says:
"In the great anxiety on the part of our Legislatures to make the most ample provisions
for speedy relief from unlawful confinement
authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus
has been conferred upon inferior judicial
officers, who make use of It sometimes as if it
were a writ of error, under which they might
correct the errors and irregularities of other
judges and courts, whatever their relative
jurisdiction and dignity. Any such employment of the writ is an abuse. Where a party
who is in confinement under judicial process
is brought up on habeas corpus, the court or
judge before whom he is returned will inquire: (1) Whether the court or officer issuing the process under which he is detained
had jurisdiction of the case, and has acted
within that jurisdiction In Issuing such process. If so, mere irregularities or errors of
judgment In the exercise of that jurisdiction
must be disregarded on this writ, and must be
corrected either by the court issuing the process, or on regular appellate proceedings. (2)
If the process is not void for want of Jurisdiction, the further inquiry will be made,
whether, by law, the case is bailable, and, if
so, bail will be taken if the party offers it;
otherwise he will be remanded to the proper
custody." The writ of habeas corpus cannot be
made to serve the purpose of an appeal or writ
of review, unless some statute specially authorizes this to be done. But, even when authorized by statute, such review must be strictly
limited to the special proceeding to which the
statute applies. This is well illustrated by
the decisions emanating from the same courts
In habeas corpus proceedings. In California,
where there is a special statute authorizing
the courts on habeas corpus to determine
whether or not there is probable cause to commit the accused on preliminary hearing by
the magistrate, the Supreme Court of California hold that the courts on habeas corpus
may examine into the facts to determine
whether there- is any evidence that Justifies
the findings of probable cause by the magistrate. People •. Smith, 1 Cal. 9. Similar
holdings based upon similar statutes are
found in State v. Hayden, 35 Minn. 283, 28
N. W. 6*59, and other cases; but the authority to do this comes from the statute, and,
where .there is no statutory provision, the
courts do not extend the scope of the investigation on habeas corpus so as to make the
proceeding in effect one of review. This is
again illustrated by the decisions of the same
courts, to which we have already referred.
In the following cases: State v. Kinmore, 54
Minn. 135, 55 N. W. 830, 40 Am. S t Rep.
309; Ex parte Miller, 82 Cal. 454. 22 Pac.
1113. Where the common law is In force,"
or under statutes which are in effect merely
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ieclaratory of the common law, the courts,
m habeas corpus, may not extend the investigation beyond jurisdictional matters.
The following cases, among a large number
that might be cited, clearly state the rule:
Turner v. Conkey, 132 Ind. 248, 31 N. E. 777,
17 L R. A. r,09. 32 Am. St. Rep. 251 ; State v.
Klnmorc, 54 Minn 135. 55 N. W. 830. 40 Am.
St. Rep. 305; Smith v. Clausmeier, 136 Ind.
105, 35 N. E. 904, 43 Am. St. Rep. 311; Horner v. United States, 143 D. S. 570-578, 12 Sup.
C t 522, 36 L. Ed. 2GG; Young v. Fain. 121 Ga.
737, 49 S. E. 731; Ex parte Perdue, 58 Ark.
285. 24 S. W. 423; Merriman v. Morgan, 7
Or. GO. There is no statutory authority in
this state whereby a court or judge, on habeas corpus, may review the evidence adduced before a magistrate in support of a
criminal charge for the purpose of determining whether the evidence was either competent or sufficient to warrant the magistrate in
holding the accused for trial to the district
court and in committing him for that purpose.
The proceedings had betore the magistrate in
this cai=e are not attacked upon jurisdictional grounds. There was a proper complaint
which charged an offense. The magistrate
had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of
the person of the accused. A hearing was
had. Witnesses were sworn, and testified
both for the state and the accused, and their
testimony was reduced to writing. All this
was in compliance with the law of this state.
The commitment papers are not attacked. In
addition to the foregoing, the transcript of
all the proceedings had before the magistrate
discloses that the law had been complied
with In every particular. This being so, the
district court who heard the habeas corpus
proceeding had no authority to review the evidence heard by the magistrate for the purpose of determining its sufficiency to support
the judgment or order entered by him in holding the accused to answer to the district
court In order to justify the district court
to so review the evidence would require that
the writ of habeas corpus be transformed to
a writ of review, which, as Judge Cooley well
says, would be an abuse of the writ. It is not
the province of a court or judge, on habeas
corpus, to determine whether in his judgment
the evidence is sufficient to warrant the binding over of the accused or not. The ouly
question in such a proceeding i s : Is the accused illegally restrained of his liberty? The
magistrate may err in his judgment both
with regard to the competency aud the sufficiency of the evidence, but this alone does
not make the restraint illegal. It would at
most make it erroneous. Errors must be
cured by an appeal or in proceedings provided by law and Instituted for that purpose.
But the district court in this proceeding
went beyond what the authorities justify
even In those states where there are special
statutes permitting courts on habeas corpus
to review the findings of the magistrate made
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on preliminary examinations. In those states
the general rule is that the court or judge on
habeas corpus may examine Into the evidence
for the purpose only of determining whether
there Is any legal evidence which fairly tends
to support the findings and order of the magistrate. State •. Hayden, supra; United
States v. Greene (D. C) 108 Fed. 816; In re
Henry, 13 Misc. Rep. 734, 35 N. Y. Supp. 210;
State v. Beaverstad, 12 N. D. 527, 97 N. W.
548; Ex parte Becker, 86 Cal. 402, 25 Pac. 0.
The evidence in the record directly and positively connects the respondent with the shooting which it is claimed resulted in the death
ot the person named In the complaint filled
with the magistrate. This being so, the district court was not authorized to pas3 upon
the competency of the evidence In a habeas
corpus proceeding. In view of the statutes
of this state governing preliminary examinations and the fundamental principles underlying proceedings in habeas corpus, we are
constrained to hold that where the record;
certified to by the magistrate, affirmatively
shows what we have stated the record in this
case discloses, and there Is no attack upon the
truthfulness of the facts recited in the record, the court Is powerless to go behind the
judgment of the magistrate. If, however, the
accused should allege and offer to prove that
the magistrate did not In fact hear any evl
dence in support of the charge, and the accused did not, with the consent of the state,
waive an examination, and that the record
showing the proceedings of the magistrate la
false, then the court or judge, on habeas corpus proceeding, should hear the evidence In
that regard; and, If he finds that there was
no preliminary examination or hearing by
the magistrate, the accused should be discharged.
The order or judgment of the district court
discharging the respondent therefore should
be, and accordingly Is, reversed.
McCARTY, C. J., and STRAUP, J., concur.

JONES v- BLYTHE.
(Supreme Court of Utah. Jan. 30, 1908.)
1. ANnr-Axs— R U N N I N G
LAWS.

AT

LABGE — F E N C *

Though under Rev. St. 1S98, § 20, providing that if sheep, etc., shall trespass on the
premises of any person, except where such premises are not inclosed by a lawful fence in counties in which a fence is required by law, the
party aggrieved may recover damages by action
or by distraining1, as therein provided, an owner
of sheep is not liable for damages resulting from
an unintentional trespass on uuinclosed lands in
a county in which a fence law is in force, yet
he is liable where he intentionally drives ni?
sheep on sach land.
<A
2. SAME—TRESPASSING
—SfFFtClENCY.

ANIMALS — EVIDENCE

Exidence in an action for damages caused
by sheep trespassing on premises held to show
that the owner of the sheep, after bein? notified
to keep them off the premises, willfully drove
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them thceon and kept them there till they had I and that defendant has threatened and still
eaten and destroyed much of the grass.*
threatens to and will use force and violence
Appeal from District Court, Box Elder against plaintiff if he attempts to keep said
County; W. W. Maughan, Judge.
sheep from said premises." The allegations
Action by William Jones against John describing the alleged trespass are substanBlythe. Judgment for plaintiff, and defend- tially the same In both causes of action. Deant appeals. Affirmed.
fendant answered, and specifically denied
Maginnls & Corn, tor appellant. J. D. each and every material allegation of the
complaint, and as a further defense pleaded
Call, for respondent.
an ordinance entitled "An ordinance defining
McCARTY, J. This Is an appeal by the a lawful fence In Box Elder county, state of
defendant from a judgment rendered In the Utah," which ordinance, the record shows,
district court of Box Elder county In favor was duly and regularly passed by the board
of plaintiff for damages alleged to have been I of county commissioners ot Box Elder councaused by defendant's sheep trespassing up- ty, and w a s at the time of the alleged treson and eating off and destroying the grass pass In full force and effect
The evidence, without conflict, shows that
and herbage upon certain lands of plaintiff
situated in the northwestern part of Box plaintiff, long prior to the alleged trespass,
BUler county, this state. The land is de- notified defendant to keep off the land In
scribed In the complaint as follows: "All of question, and not to herd or bed his sheep
thereon. On this point defendant
testlQed
sections 29. 30, 31, and 32, township 14 N.,
of range 17 W„ Salt Lake Meridian"—and In part as follows: "I remember a conversaIs situated in what is known as "Cotton tion with Mr. Jones rpiaintiff and respondThomas Basin." This basin has an area of ent herein]. It was about five or six years ago.
about 25 or CO square miles, and is surround- He came and told me the sheep were on his
land, and wanted me to keep them off.
ed by mountains. At the time of the alleged
trespass the land was partly Inclosed by a I • * • He asked me If I would keep them
fence, which extended along the eastern and off. I said, 'No;' that I would not; that he
northern boundary thereof.
A few rods was trying to control too much country; that
south of the southern boundary there was a I did not believe he could take up the land
line of fence posts extending east and west in the shape he said he was doing.* And
along the south side of the premises. There again the defendant testified: "At the time
was no fence along the western line or bound- charged that my sheep were upon this land
ary of the land. The premises were covered I. had no means of knowing where the sections
with different kinds of grass, brush, and were, except by the posts and what fencing
herbage, upon which cattle and other ani- there w a s there." That the trespass was
mals fed and browsed. This land was used willful and intentional is shown by the tesby plaintiff for grazing purposes, and during timony of defendant's witness R. C. Reid,
the summer season of each year he pastured who testified in part as follows: "I have
thereon several hundred head of cattle. The been Mr. BIyrbe's (defendant's) foreman for
complaint contains two causes of action. In two years. Mr. Rice, Mr. Bronson, and Jess
the first cause of action It Is alleged that the Jones came to the camp and asked me If I
Intended to run on those four sections of
damage was cau c ed between the 1st day of
June and the 11th day of July, 190ft; and Jones'. * * * I told them that I Intended
to
run upon the basin there. They asked me
In the second cause of action It Is alleged
if I did not know what Jones claimed, and
that the trespass complained of was committed between the 1st day of June and the I said I knew he claimed Inside of the posts,
15th day of July, 1905. The particular acts and that I was going to run in there, leaving
of trespass relied on for recovery In the first a place for his horses. • • • Mr. Blythe
cause of action are alleged In the complaint told me to run in the basin there; • • *
as follows: "That at divers times and upon that he didn't think Jones had any land In
there; and that he intended to feed In there."
each and every day between the dates herein alleged, the defendant, his agents, and On cross-examination the witness stated that
he
was on the four sections of land in quesemployes, willfully trespassed upon said land
by driving In and upon said land a large tion with defendant's sheep in June, July, and
number of sheep, to wit, about 6.000 head, August of 1905; that on one occasion two
and maintained camps and sheep beds, and camps or beds were maintained there continherded said sheep thereon for and durlrg all I uously for six days; and that the sheep could
of «afd period of time, * * * and fcs a "go over in two days and take aif the feed
result thereof the said sheep ate, browsed, off pretty close." To the question, "You went
killed, and "destroyed the grass, verdure, un- on Intentionally, did you?" he answered, "I
derbrush, and a large number of small treos undoubtedly did, because I told the men to
growing on said land." It Is further alleged let the sheep feed up through there." A s to
that "plaintiff warned said defendant against the effect the hording and bedding of the
driving and herding his said sheep upon said sheep on the premises bad on the grass and
real estate, or permitting them to go thereon, other vegetation growing thereon, Mr. Rice,
who had charge of plaintiffs cattle and the
•Buford T. Houtz, f Utah. 691, 18 Pac. 633.
• I land in question at the time of the trespasses
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as a saddle bor.-e, nnd liked the looks of a
saddle horse with split ears; that, although
he had been the owner of horses before, this
was the first time that he had ever slit th*
ears of a horse; that he bad always understood that when a horse's ears were split It
was to signify that the animal was mean or
vicious; and that he bad never heard of such
a thing being done for the purpose of identifying an animal, or as a mark of ownership.
There was evidence that the defendant had
admitted that at the time he slit the ears of
the animal he knew that it belonged to
Thomas Beasore. It was admitted that the
defendant branded the colt and slit its ears,
and afterwards burned out the brand and
turned the colt loose. The testimony was
without conflict to the effect that it has been
a custom for many years to split the ears of
vicious or unmanageable horses, that a spilt
in a horse's ear was intended to signify that
the horse was vicious, and that such splits
are never used as marks of ownership.
The foregoing Is substantially all the evidence shown by the record'. /The defendant
acknowledging that be slit the ears of the
colt, and there being evidence sufficient to
sustain a finding by the jury that at the
time he so did he knew that the animal belonged to and was the property of Thomas
Beasore, the question remained as to whether the slitting was done for the purpose of
preventing identification of the animal by
Boasore. Upon this question we cannot say
that the finding of the jury is not sustained
by the evidence. Where some particular 1Dtent is a necessary element to constitute an
act a crime, such intent may be sufficiently
shown by the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the act. Here, in support of
the verdict, it must be assumed that the defendant knew that the colt was the property
of Beasore, and that he did not think.it was
an estray.. Under these circumstances he,
having taken the animal from the range
where it was grazing, placed a brand upon it
and slit its ears. The evidence as to the
placing of the brand on the animal was, of
course, material and competent upon the
question as to what the intention of the defendant was In the slitting of the ears.
Both things were done by the defendant at
the same time, and apparently, despite defondant's statement to the contrary, for the
same purpose. The nature of the act, the
thus double marking of the animal by brand
aud mark, and the circumstances attending
the doing thereof. Including statements made
hj" defendant which the jury found to be untrue, were sufficient to sustain the finding
that the slitting was done for the purpose of
preventing identification of the animal.
That it might reasonably assist in accomplishing that purpose is very <lear, even if
such slits are not ordinarily used as marks
of ownership, and are generally used simply
to indicate a vicious animal. The statement
of the defendant as to his reason for thus

<Cal

r marking the animal was, of course, not conclusive upon the jury. The most that can be
said for defendant is that there was a conflict In the evidence as to the intent with
which the act was done, and the well-settled
j rule that the appellate court will not, under
such circumstances, disturb the finding of the
Jury, prohibits us from interfering therewith.
The case of Fossett v. State, 11 Tex. App.
40, 45, relied on by defendant, fully recognizes the rule that "the surrounding facts—
the facts and circumstances which hover
around and give character to the act"—are
to be taken into consideration in determining
as to the intent with which such an act as is
! here Involved Is done.
I 3. Complaint Is made that the court refused to give certain instructions requested
by the defendant W e have examined these
requested instructions, and find no error la
the action of the court. The,court did instruct the Jury t h a t before they could convict
the defendant, they must be convinced by the
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
I slitting of the horse's ears was such a mark| ing of an animal as might prevent the identification thereof by the true owner; and this
was certainly as liberal an Instruction in reI gard to the character of the mark as the de! fendant was entitled to. As has been said
| before, it Is the placing of any mark upon the
| animal, with the intent thereby to prevent
identification by the owner, that is de; nounced by the statute here involved
i Whether the mark adopted by the offendei
) for that purpose is such that it will accomI plish the result desired is not material.
I What the statute really makes an offense l&
' an attempt to prevent the identification ol
! the animal by the true owner, by the placing
of a mark thereon. As in the case of an at
tempt to commit a crime, it is not essential
' that the means used should In fact be capa
1
ble of accomplishing the result designed
; The jury were very fully instructed that tbej
j could not convict the defendant unless thej
| were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt thai
! the defendant slit the animal's ears for tb<
!' purpose of preventing its identification bj
the true owner.
The judgment and order are affirmed.
We concur:

SHAW, J. ; VAN DYKE, J.

MAZOR r. SPRINGER et ai. (S. P. 8,054.)
(Supreme Court of California, Oct 8, 1904.)
N E W T R I A . L — N E W L Y O I S C O V E R E D EVIDENCE—*
TIME O F D I S C O V E B T .

1. In an action against two defendants tor
work and labor, one defendant admitted that the
work was performed at his request, and plaintiff and another witness testified that the other
defendant also requested the performance of the
work. On motion for a new trial on the ground
of newly discovered evidence it was claimed
that the defendant last mentioned was not at
the pface where this request was claimed to
have been made on the date at which it *'**
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claimed to have been made; but no witnesses
other than those present at the trial were mentioned as able to testify to thia effect No excuse for not calling these witnesses was produced, except the statement in the affidavit ol
the defendant who requested the services that
the fact of the other defendant's absence at the
time of the alleged Interview had not occurred
to defendants until after the trial. Held, that
as the new evidence would not affect the liability of affiant and as he was not qualified to
apeak for the other defendant, a new trial was
properly refused.
Department 1.
Appeal from Superior
Court, Santa Clara County; M. H. Hyland,
Judge.
Action by Stanislaus Mazor against Mary
Springer and another. From a judgment for
plaintiff, and from an order denying a motion
'or a new trial, defendants appeal. Affirmed.
J. H. Campbell, for appellants. B. A. Herrlngton, tor
respondent
SHAW, J. This is an action to recover
wages for labor performed. Defendants appeal from the Judgment, and from an order
denying their motion for a new t r i a l
There was sufficient evidence to prove the
allegation that the plaintiff performed the
work in question at the request of the defendant Mary Springer. The plaintiff testifies
positively to that effect, and he was corroborated by the witness Gil man. The answer
does not deny the request so far as the defendant Sage Is concerned. The plaintiff also
testified, In effect, that the agreement was
that he was to receive $15 for the first month
and $25 per month thereafter, and that he
f o r k e d the entire time for which he Claims,
except 17 days. This was sufficient to support the verdict We cannot say, from the
Evidence, that the jury did not deduct the
wages for the time be was absent, nor can
we disturb the verdict, where the evidence
i» conflicting, although the preponderance
inay now seem to be for the defendants.
£ T h e court did not err In denying the motion
«>r a new trial on the ground of surprise at
the testimony of Gllman concerning the cont a c t made in his presence between the plaintiff and the defendant Springer, and of the
discovery of new evidence relating thereto.
Th« new evidence was to the effect that on
•he afternoon on which Gilman said the conversation took place at the bouse of Mary
Springer she was "many miles distant*' from
*be house. It Is not alleged that there was
an
7 witness, other than those present at the
trial, by whom her absence at that time
could have been proven; nor Is her whereabouts at that time stated. The only excuse
*°r not calling the witnesses present at the
Wal to testify to her absence was that contacted in the affidavit of the defendant Sage,
*hat the "fact of the absence of Mary Springer fro m the said Springer farm did not oe^ to their (defendants') minds until several
days after the trial was concluded." Her absence, if proven, would not nSect the }iablh
" * of Sage, who admits making the request
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He was not qualified to speak concerning the
mind and memory of Mrs. Springer, and she
made no affidavit Under these circumstances the court did not abase its
dlscretlazi'ln
refusing a new trial upon these grounds.
The Judgment and the order denying the
defendants' motion for a new trial are affirmed.
We concur:
DYKE, J.

ANGELLOTTl,

J.;

VAN

In re CLARK.
(Supreme Court of Utah, $OT. 16, 1904.)
HABEAS

COBPUS—COHVICTION—REVIEW.

1. Where relator was convicted and sentenced
for grand larceny by a court of competent jurisdiction, be was not entitled to a writ of habeas
corpus for the purpose of reviewing a judgment
based on such conviction.
Appeal from District Court, Salt I>ake
County; C. W. Morse, Judge.
Application of J. H. Clark for a writ of
habeas corpus to review a conviction of
grand larceny. Prom an order denying the
writ, relator appeals. Affirmed.
D. S. Truman, for appellant M. A. Breeden, Arty. Gen., and W. R, White, Dep. Atty.
Gen., for the State.
B A SKIN, C. J. The petitioner appeals to
this court from an order of the district court
denying his application for a writ of habeas
corpus. It appears from the allegations of
the petitioner that he and Z. Graham and
Albert Clark were Jointly charged by information with the crime of larceny, and in a
separate count they were also jointly charged with the crime of receiving stolen property, knowing the same to have been stolen;
that the property alleged in the first count
of the information to have been stolen was
the same as that alleged in the second count
as having been received, and was the personal property of one C. F. Johnson. The
said Graham and the petitioner were granted separate trials, and each found guilty of
grand larceny and sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary, and at present are
serving that sentence. Afterwards the said
Albert Clark was, upon a separate trial,
found guilty of the crime charged In the second count of the information, and sentenced
to imprisonment in the county jail and to
pay a fine of $250. The petitioner appealed
from the judgment against him, and it was
affirmed by this court In State v. Clark, 74
Pac. 119.
^
. Habeas corpus cannot operate as an appeal or writ of error. It la well settled that
"the examination into the imprisonment of
a party under the sentence or order of a
court is to extend only to the jurisdiction
and authority to render the judgment, and
f 1. Ex parte Hays. 47 Pac. fa2 IS Utah. 77.
See Habeas Corpus, vol. 25, Cent. Dig. -| i.
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where the custody Is In pursuance of the order or judgment of a court of competent j u r isdiction, such order is final until It is reversed, and precludes inquiry on t h e writ."
9 Enc. PI. & Pr. 10G1, and cases there cited.
In Ex p a r t e Hays. 15 Utah, 77, 47 Pac. 612,
this court. In an opinion delivered by Mr.
Justice Bartch, held t h a t "in a criminal case,
where the district court has jurisdiction of
the person and cause, its judgment is binding on oil the world, until reversed in a regular way by appeal. A fortiori is this so
after the judgment has been affirmed by the
Supreme Court. Such a judgment is final,
and pronounces t h e law of the case; and the
Supreme Court will not, upon habeas corpus,
look beyond it, and review the proceedings
upon which the Judgment w a s pronounced."
In the case of State v. Clark, supra, the district court had jurisdiction-'of the petitioner
and the subject-matter of the Information
upon which he was convicted and sentenced.
The writ of habeas corpus applied for by the
petitioner was therefore properly denied.
The order denying the writ is affirmed.
BAUTCH and McCARTY, J J . , concur.

E N G L I S H v. OPENSHAW.
(Supreme Court of Utah. Nov. 11, 1904.)
QUIETING TITLE—AD VERSE POSSESSION—BUBDEN OF PBOOF—EVIDENCE—DEEDS—LETTERS.

1. Where a warranty deed in favor of defendant was regular on its face, it was admissible
in an action to quiet title without evidence being first introduced showing possession thereunder.
2. Evidence reviewed, and held insufficient to
establish that plaintiff's possession of certain
land in controversy was adverse to defendant.
3. Under Rev. St. $ 2861, providing that in
every action for the recovery of real property
or the possession thereof the person establishing
a legal title shall be presumed to have been
jossessed thereof within the time required by
aw, etc., the burden is on one, olniminfl title
by adverse possession to prove the same, and
not on the defendant to establish that he was
in possession under his legal title for the statutory period.
4. Where, in an action to quiet title, plaintiff
claimed title by adverse possession, a letter written by her to defendant, in which plaintiff recognized his interest in the land, was admissible.
Appeal from District Court, Salt L a k e
County; W. C. Hall, Judge.
Action by Eliza English against Joseph H.
Openshaw. From a judgment in favor of
defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

f

This action was brought against the defendant to quiet plaintiff's title to certain
real estate situate in Salt Lake City. The
complaint alleged ownership and possession
for many years in the plaintiff, and adverse
claim without right in the defendant. The
defendant answered, denying plaintiff's pos% 3. Funk v. Anderson, 22 Utah. 238, 61 Pac. 1006;
Center Creek Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay, 21 Ulab, 392,
60 Pac. 559. Smith v. North Canyon Water Co., 16
Utah, 194, 62 Pac. 283.

(Utah

session, except as a co-tenant with himself,
and alleged alfirmatively, by way of counterclaim, that he .was the owner In fee of an
undivided one-third interest in t h e property
by virtue of a deed from Andrew English,
and demanded judgment accordingly. By
way of reply plaintiff denied the tenancy in
common and the execution and delivery of
the deed from Andrew English to the defendant, and further alleged that, if such deed
was ever executed, it was intended a s a
mortgage to secure money advanced by t h e
defendant to t h e two sous of Andrew English, who were also grantees in the deed.
T h e plaintiff also pleaded the s t a t u t e of limitations. From the evidence it appears t h a t
t h e plaintiff is a daughter of Andrew and
Nancy English, husband and wife; t h a t t h e
defendant was married to plaintiff's sister,
who died before thi9 litigation was commenced; t h a t the defendant a n d . G e o r g e W.
and Jesse R. English, two brothers of the
plaintiff, in 1881 concluded to advance some
money to buy a home for their father and
mother, aud thereafter the two sons and the
defendant jointly contributed $1,325, the
amount for which the property in controversy was purchased on August 2, 1881; t h a t
t h e defendant contributed $500 of the purchase money and the sons the remainder;
t h a t , according to previous arrangement between the parties, the property w a s conveyed by warranty deed to Andrew English,
who acted as agent for the contributors;
t h a t in addition to bis contribution, t h e defendant also purchased shingles and lumber,
and t h e three contributors then repaired the
house upon the premises; t h a t it w a s understood between the parties t h a t the purchase w a s made to provide a home for the
aged father and mother, who should occupy
t h e premises as long as they lived, the defendant insisting t h a t so long as they occupied the property they should pay the taxes
thereon; t h a t in September, 1881, the father,
with bis family, entered into possession of
the property, and continued so in possession
until his death in March, 1892; t h a t the
plaintiff continued in possession with her
mother until the latter's death in June, 1903;
, t h a t about 10 years previous to his death, on
! September 26, 18S2, the grantee conveyed the
j same property to George W. and Jesse REnglish and the defendant by w a r r a n t y deed;
t h a t by virtue of this last-mentioned deed,
which was made a t the request of the grantees therein, who had furnished the money
for the purchase, the defendant claims a n undivided one-third interest in the property;
a n d t h a t in 1895 the widow of Andrew English conveyed, by quitclaim deed, the same
property to the plaintiff. It also appears
from the evidence t h a t in June, 1894, the
plaintiff, referring to the same property,
wrote the defendant in p a r t as follows:
" W e know we can't do anything without
your consent. W h a t do you think would be
| best to do? Would you sell your interest
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outright to us? If so, how much would you
take? Or would you r a t h e r sign a mortgage
and still hold your interest? I don't know
w h a t property is worth for there is none sold
around us for a long time. If we bought
your interest we would have to get the money
on the place for you. We have a friend who
would loan us t h e money provided all the
parties signed the mortgage." At the trial
t h e court made findings in favor of the defendant, and entered a decree adjudging the
defendant to be t h e owner of an undivided
one-third interest in the property and quieting his title thereto. This appeal is from
the judgment.
F r a n k H. Clark, for appellant.
Sutherland, Van Cott & Allison, Ben Johnson, and
8. H . Lewis, for r e s p o n d e n t
Upon a s t a t e m e n t of t h e case, a s above,
BARTOH, J., delivered the opinion of the
court.
•
At t h e trial t h e defendant offered in evidence the w a r r a n t y deed dated September
26, 1882, from A n d r e w English to George
W. English, J e s s e R. English, and the defendant, conveying to the grantees the property in controversy herein. To this offer t h e
plaintiff objected upon the ground t h a t from
September, 1881, until his death, in 1892,
the grantee w a s in possession of t h e premises, and thereafter until the present time
his heirs were in possession, and t h a t such
being the case, even if he m a d e t h e deed,
his title could not be disturbed by i t This
objection w a s overruled, and the action of
the court has been assigned as error.
• The appellant insists t h a t t h e court erred
In admitting the deed in evidence without
first requiring a showing of possession by
the defendant under i t especially a s actual
and adverse possession h a d been shown in
plaintiff's ancestors and herself for a period
beyond tbe time prescribed in the statute of
limitations. Under t h e facts and circumstances disclosed by t h e record this contention is not well taken. T h e first point made
refers simply to the oAier of proof, a matter
which was within t h e sound discretion of
the court; and no abuse of discretion has
been shown. T h a t a w a r r a n t y deed regular
upon its face cannot be admitted in evidence
without first showing possession under i t
to not the law. Possession may be shown
afterwards, a s w a s done in this case. Referring to the second point made—the adverse possession of plaintiff and ancestors
and the bar of the s t a t u t e — t h e proof seems
wholly inadequate to render t h e bar complete. The circumstances under which the
property w a s purchased, the purpose for
Jfhich and the m a n n e r in which tbe.purchase
*»8 made, the homeless and financial cona t i o n of plaintiff's p a r e n t s in their old days,
the understanding between the contributors
?f the purchase money that t h e parents
laould enjoy t h e proDertv as a home -as Ion*
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as they lived, the fact t h a t they did so enjoy i t the evidence tending to show t h a t t h e
father acted as a g e n t for the contributor*
and received the deed to tbe property a s
such, the conveyance by him to tbe contributors a year after he had taken possession of the property, the recognition in writing by the plaintiff of the defendant's interest in the property after the death of the
grantor who executed the deed in controversy, the deed itself—all these things
strongly tend to show t h a t the possession
of the plaintiff and her ancestors, as to t h e
interest of the defendant in the property,
wag permissive, and not hostile. The proof
fails to show that there w a s ever any overt
act, or anything said or done by those in
actual possession, t h a t could be construed
as a notice to the defendant t h a t they were
claiming or holding possession adversely to
him. The mere fact t h a t the grantor and
his family remained in possession after he
executed the deed to t h e defendaut and others does not render their possession adverse to the grantees. By his deed the grantor passed the legal title to a one-third interest in the property to the defendant a s
grantee, and his covenants in the deed raised
the presumption t h a t his occupation of t h e
property thereafter w a s under and in subordination to the legal title. To overthrow
this presumption, t h e p a r t y claiming adversely bad the burden to establish the f a c t b y
competent evidence, t h a t an adverse possession continued for t h e statutory period of
limitation. This is so under our s t a t u t e .
Section 2861, Rev. S t The same principle
has been announced by this c o u r t F u n k v.
Anderson, 22 Utah, 238, 61 Pac. 1006; Center Creek Irr. Co. v. Lindsay, 21 Utah, 192,
60 P a c . 559; Smith v. North Canyon W a t e r
Co., 16 Utah, 194, 52 Pac. 283. And such is
the law in other jurisdictions. Schwallback
v. O., M. & St. P. R. Co., 69 Wis. 292, 34 N.
W. 128, 2 Am. S t Rep. 740; McNeil v. Jordan, 28 Kan. 7; Dawson v. Bank, 15 Mich.
489; Jeffery v. Hursb, 45 Mich. 59, 7 N. W.
221; Catlin v. Decker, 38 Conn. 202; Whiting v. Edmunds, 94 N. Y. 309. The proof in
this case is wholly inadequate to establish
title by adverse possession. We are of t h e
opinion t h a t the deed w a s properly admitted
in evidence; t h a t it was not a mortgage, but
an absolute conveyance; and that the plea
of adverse possession and of t h e b a r by virtue of the s t a t u t e of limitations cannot avail
the appellant
It is also contended by the appellant t h a t
the court erred in admitting in evidence the
portion of the letter written by the plaintiff
to the defendant in J u n e , 1894, but we perceive nothing to w a r r a n t this contention.
The writing shows a recognition of the interest of the defendant in the property by
the person who is now claiming to have
held adverse possession at the very time she
wrote the letter. The foundation for its
admission was nronerlv Inirl Tt wna fhora.
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ty, and his unrestricted right of disposition,
which; he contended, a corporation did not
possess.' These vjews, however, were afterwards overruled, in the case of Arthur v.
Bank, supra, by the high court of errors and
appeals, and the doctrine settled in that state
that a corporation may prefer one creditor
over another. The Washington cases appear
to sustain appellant's contention that an insolvent corporation, even in the absence of
statutory provision on the subject, cannot
prefer creditors, and that its assets are a
trust fund for the equal benefit of its creditors; but they are so manifestly against the
weight of authority that w e must decline to
follow them. Other cases in other states
have denied preferences when made for the
benefit of officers or agents of the corporation, to give them, by reason of their positions, an advantage over creditors, and where,
by statutory enactment, preferences were
prohibited; but such cases cannot be considered as authority in this case, where the
assignment was made under no such objection or prohibition. With these cases must
be classed that of the Noble Mercantile Co.
v. ML Pleasant Equitable Co-operative Inst.,
12 Utah, 213, 42 Pac. 809, where the court
properly held that the directors of an insolvent corporation, which had abandoned the
objects for which it was created, could not
prefer themselves, by voluntary deed of assignment, over other creditors, whose claims
were equally meritorious. While the same
question here discussed was there argued by
counsel, the court expressly declined to pass
upon it, because it was not necessary to a
decision in that case. Such cases are not in
point here.
Upon careful examination of adjudged
cases, as well as upon principle and analogy, and in the absence of insolvent laws and
statutory restrictions, we feel ourselves
bound to hold that a corporation, in this
state, has the same power to prefer creditors,
by deed of assignment or otherwise, as a private debtor has, so long as its assets have
not been taken into possession by a court of
equity, in a proper proceeding, at the instance of a proper party. The rule in the
case of a corporation, the same as in that of
an individual, is impregnable, except by legislative enactmenL This also appears to be
in harmony with the English rule, for there
the power of a corporation to prefer creditors
seems to be fully established, except as restricted by statute. In re Wincham Ship
Building, Boiler & Salt Co., 9 Ch. Div. 322;
Willmott v. Celluloid Co., 34 Ch. Div. 147.
While we are not disposed to enlarge the rule
so as to include cases not strictly within its
terms, yet where it is applicable, as in the
case at bar, it must be regarded and upheld
as a law of this state no longer open to question. Whelher, if we were free from the authority of judicial decisions, we would entertain different views from those heroin expressed, is now a matter of no concern. It
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Is but for us to declare what is the law, and,
if such law is not in consonance with reason
and justice, it is within the power of the
legislature to make it s o / A court ought
not, for light reasons, to assume to declare
that not to be the law which has been accepted and treated as the law, by courts as
well as the populace, for a long period of
time,—not even though such court may feel
impelled to inveigh against the rule as not
founded in the soundest reason and policy.
Especially is this so when such law has become the rule of practice in the business
world, and when the business interests of the
state have grown up under IL
The contention of the appellant that the assignment dissolved the corporation is not tenable. The law is well settled that a mere
transfer of the corporate property of a corporation to a trustee, for the purpose of paying its debts, does not per se work a dissolution, and there Is nothing in the deed of assignment in this case which would produce
such a result. Manufactory v. Langdon, 24
Pick. 49; Town v. Bank, 2 Doug. 530; Bruffett v. Railroad Co., 25 111. 310; Pyles T. Furniture Co. (W. Va.) 2 S. E. 909, 921; Reichwald v. Hotel Co., 10G 111. 439; B u e l l V
Buckingham, 16 Iowa, 284.
W e do not deem it necessary to discuss any
other question presented in this case. The
judgment of the court below is affirmed.
MINER, J., concurs. ZANE, C. J.,*concurs
in the affirmance of the judgment appealed
from, but not in all the propositions of law
held in the opinion.

(15 Utah, 77)

Ex parte HAYS.
(Supreme Court of Utah. Jan. 15, 1897.)
HABEAS COKPOS—JURISDICTION—CIUMIKTAX LAW—
JUDGMENT—VALIDITT.

1. Where a prisoner convicted of the crime
of murder is in the custody of the proper officer,
who detains him under a warrant, fair and regular on its face, issued after conviction and
judgment by a court of record, which had jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter, he
will not be discharged on habeas corpus.*
2. In a criminal case, where the district court
has jurisdiction of the person and cause, it*
judgment is binding on all the world, until reversed in a regular way by appeal. A fortiori
is this so after the judgment has been affirmed
by the supreme court. Such a judgment is
final, and pronounces the law of the case; and
the supreme court will not, upon habeas corpus,
look beyond it, and review the proceedings upon which the judgment was pronounced.
3. A prisoner's detention under a judgment,
the commitment being regular on its face, cannot be unlawful unless the judgment is an absolute nullity, and irregularities and mere errors in proceedings will not render it an absolute nullity, although they may render it voidable; and, when voidable only, it is conclusive-,
ly presumed to be valid until reversed, and it
cannot be reversed by habeas corpus.
4. Where a case has been tried in a district-court, and the judgment rendered at the trial
has been affirmed by the supreme court, such
trial and judgment will be presumed to be legal.
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and cannot be questioned upon habeas corpus
for anything except a want of jurisdiction,
shown^upon the face of the record or proceedings, as ruled upon in the supreme court.
^Syllabus by the Court.)
Application by Harry Hays for a writ of
habeas corpus. Denied.
Powers, Straup & Llppinan, for petitioner.
A. C. Bishop, Atty. Gen., and F. B. Stephens,
for respondent.
BARTCH, J. The petitioner in this case
on the 1st day of April, 1896, was convicted
of the crime of murder in the first degree,
and thereafter judgment of death by bang*
ing was pronounced against him; and since
then he has been in the custody of the sheriff
of Utah county, who justifies his detention
of the petitioner by virtue of the death warrant and commitment issued to him by the
district court of said county. The warrant
and commitment, a copy of which is attached to the petition, appear to be regular and
In proper form. He complains that the sentence or judgment by virtue of which he is
in confinement is void, because, as he maintains, his trial w a s not conducted in pursuance of law, and that, therefore, his detention Is illegal. The contention of the petitioner is that the jurors who sat in the trial
of the case were not drawn pursuant to any
valid law of the state; that the act under
which they were drawn to serve as jurors
was unconstitutional, and w a s repealed by a
later law, .which took effect prior to the commencement of the trial; and that as jurors
who sat in the trial of the case were summoned under the repealed law, and as the
trial w a s conducted under the later law, an
error which is fatal to the judgment and sentence was committed. This case w a s appealed to this court, but none of these points
were presented in that appeal, and the judgment w a s affirmed. 46 Pac. 752.
The important and decisive question, which
confronts us at the outset, is, can this court,
In a collateral proceeding by habeas corpus,
look beyond the judgment, and determine
questions which arose during the trial of the
case, and which, if t h e y had been presented
In the record on appeal, might have resulted
in a reversal of the judgment? We think
not The warrant appears rair and regular
on Its face, and that the district court In
which the case w a s tried had jurisdiction of
the person and subject-matter is not, and
cannot be successfully, questioned. This being so, and that court being a court of record, its judgment is binding upon all the
world until reversed in a regular way by appeal. A fortiori Is this so after the judgment has been affirmed by this court. Such
a judgment is final, and pronounces the law
of the case. With what propriety, then, can
this court, by means of habeas corpus, substantially reverse a judgment which the law
has placed be'yond our control? The prisoner's detention under the judgment, the eom-
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mitment being regular on its face, cannot be
unlawful unless that judgment is absolutely
null and void; and it cannot be null and
void, when the court had general jurisdiction
of the person and subject-matter, even
though it may have erred in its proceedings,
during the trial. Irregularities and mere errors in proceedings will not render a judgment an absolute nullity, although they may
render It voidable, and when voidable only
it is conclusively presumed to be valid until
reversed, and it cannot be reversed by habeas corpus, because habeas corpus does not
authorize the exercise of appellate jurisdiction; and "no inquiry," says Chancellor Kent,
"is to be made into the legality of any process, judgment, or decree, • * * where
the party is detained under the final decree
or judgment of a' competent court" 2 Kent,
Comm. 30. The district court being a court
of general jurisdiction r the offense charged
against the prisoner w a s cognizable in that
court, and it was competent to inflict the punishment provided by law for the offense of
which the prisoner w a s convicted; and its
judgment, not being reversed, has all the obligation which the judgment of any tribunal
can have.
If the judgment be voidable only, and
hence obligatory, because not reversed, w e
cannot look beyond it on habeas corpus. If
it be absolutely void, the officer who detains the prisoner and obeys the judgment is
guilty of false imprisonment Would counsel for the prisoner in this case undertake to
maintain the position that the officer is guilty
of false Imprisonment? Clearly, the detention is authorized by the judgment and warrant, and the imprisonment Is not illegal.
"The habeas corpus is undoubtedly an immediate remedy for every illegal imprisonment But no imprisonment is illegal where
the process is a justification of the officer;
and process, whether by writ or warrant! is
legal whenever it is not defective in the
frame of it, and has issued, in the ordinary
course of justice, from a court or magistrate
having jurisdiction of the subject-matter,
though there have been error in the proceedings previous to the issaing of i t " Com. v.
Lecky, 1 Watts, 66. In Ex parte Watkins, 3
P e t 193, the petitioner was imprisoned by
virtue of a judgment of a circuit court of
the United States. The motion to discharge
was founded on the aDegation that the indictment charged no offense for which the
prisoner w a s punishable in that court and
t h a t consequently, the proceedings were
coram non judice, and totally void. A copy
of the indictment was annexed to the petition. The supreme court of the United
States declined to look into the indictment
to ascertain whether the circuit court hail
misconstrued the law, maintaining that they
had no power to look beyond the judgment
in that case upon habeas corpus. Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall, in the course of his opinion, said: "An imprisonment under a judg-
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merit cannot be unlawful unless that judgment be an absolute nullity; and it la not a
nullity, if the court has general jurisdiction
of the subject, although It should be erroneous." In the case of In re Callieot, 8
Blntchf. 89, Fed. Cas. No. 2,323, the petitioner alleged that he was Imprisoned under
a sentence of the circuit court of the United
States, and charged that his Imprisonment
was illegal, "for the reason that the law under which such sentence was imposed had
been changed and repealed before said sentence was passed." The court refused to examiue the question thus presented, and denied the motion for the w r i t So, in E x
parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18, Mr. Justice Bradley, delivering the opinion of the court, said:
"When a person Is convict or In execution by
legal process issued by a court of competent
jurisdiction, no relief can be had. Of course,
a superior court will Interfere if the inferior
court had exceeded its jurisdiction, or w a s
not competent to a c t " So, in Ex parte Winston, 9 Nev. 71, the court, by Mr. Justice
Hawley, said: "On a habeas corpus the
judgment of an Inferior court cannot be "disregarded. We can only look at the record to
see whether a judgment exists, and have no
power to say whether it is right or wrong.
It is conclusively presumed to be right until
reversed; and, when the imprisonment Is
under process valid on its face, It will be
deemed prima facie legal, and, if the petitioner fails to show a want of jurisdiction
in the magistrate or court whence it emanated, his body must be remanded to custody." 2 Kent, Comm. pp. 29, 30; Church,
Hab. Corp. { 363; Hurd, Hab. Corp. 8 333;
Ex parte Gibson, 31 Cal. G19; Passmore Williamson's Case, 26 Pa. S t 9; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371; Ex parte Scwartz, 2
Tex. App. 74; E x parte Twohig, 13 Nev. 302;
Com. v. Lecky, 26 Am. Dec. 37, 40; 9 Am. &
Eng. Enc. Law, 224.
If, in the case at bar, the jurors were not
selected and summoned in pursuance of law,
and the petitioner was not satisfied with
those drawn, he was not without a remedy;
for he could have interposed his objections
by a challenge to the panel, as provided by
statute. Comp. Laws Utah 1888, §S 5004,
5009. The district court was. competent to
determine whether or not the jurors had
been erroneously selected. That court had
undoubted power to determine all the questions of which the petitioner now complains,
and if its determination as to any one of
them was erroneous, or if it failed to rule
on any one of them when it ought to have
done so, the petitioner had an opportunity
to bring the matter up in his record on appeal. If he failed to bring up his whole
case, It is his own misfortune. He cannot
be allowed to bring up part of it, and, after
this court has affirmed the judgment, have
the balance considered upon habeas corpus.
Whore a case has been tried in a district
court, and the judgment rendered at the
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trial has been affirmed by the supreme court,
such trial and judgment will be presumed
to be legal, and cannot be questioned upon
habeas corpus for anything except a want of
jurisdiction, shown upon the face of the recorder proceedings, as ruled upon In this court.
Daniels v. Towers, 79 Ga. 785, 7 S. E. 120.
We are of the opinion that the officer In this
case lawfully detained the prisoner la custody. Having reached this conclusion, It is
unnecessary to determine whether or not the
act In question is unconstitutional, or was.repealed. The writ is denied, and the prisoner
is remanded.
ZANE, C. J., and MINER, J., concur.
(30 Or. a o
F I R S T NAT. BANK OF PORTLAND T.
LINN COUNTY NAT. BANK.
(Supreme Court of Oregon. Jan. 18, 1897.)
BANK RECEIVERS — DECLARATIONS — PRESENTMENT
or CHECK—PRESUMPTIONS.

1. Even if a receiver of a national bank is its
agent, so that his admissions may be used
against it, his declarations as to receipt by it
of a draft prior to his appointment»and of which
he had no personal knowledge, are*not admissible to charge it with negligence in reference
thereto.
2. In support of a judgment, an instrument
alleged to be a sight draft, drawn by an individual on a bank, will be presumed to be an ordinary bank check.
3. The holder's laches in presenting a check
for payment will not discharge the drawer if
he had no funds in the bank applicable to its'
payment.
4. AH the evidence not being shown by the
record, it cannot be held that the verdict wag
not supported thereby.
Appeal from circuit court, Linn county,
George H. Burnett, Judge.
Action by the First National Bank of Port :
land against the Linn County National Banlti
Judgment for defendant Plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
J. N. Teal, for appellant J. K. Weatherford, for respondent
BEAN, J. This is an action to recover for
a loss suffered by the plaintiff on account of
an alleged negligent omission of duty on the
part of the defendant The substance of thei
complaint Is that on the 16th day of Juni^j
1893, the plaintiff bank forwarded by mailj
to the defendant bank, its regular agent and:
correspondent at Albany, Or., for collection;
and payment, a sight draft for $1,000, drawflj
by one J. L. Cowan on the defendant bank^
In favor of Fleischner, Mayer & Co., and byj
them indorsed to the plaintiff for deposit oBj
account; that the draft was received by thfj
defendant on the day it was mailed, but ro
did not collect or pay the same, and ueglls]
gently failed to notify the plaintiff of i t *
noncollection or nonpayment, and no actiom
w a s taken thereon until the 24th of Jun^j
when the defendant having in the meantimel
closed its doors, and passed into the hand^
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ot a national bank examiner, such examiner, { . pal; and his declarations respecting the subat the request of the plaintiff, presented the ject-matter, if made at the same time and
draft for payment, which, being refused, the forming a part of the transaction, will also
draft was duly protested; that In the regular bind him. But when the right of the agent
course of business notice of Its nonpayment j to act In a particular matter has ceased, or
could and ought to have been communicated the declarations do not accompany the a.cty
by the defendant to the plaintiff on June or are concerning a matter not within the
17th, and that then and thereafter until the I scope of the agent's authority, the principal
19th Cowan w a s possessed of ample prop- cannot be affected by them in any way. 1
erty out of which plaintiff could have enfor- Greenl. Bv. f 113; Mecbein, Ag. 115; Anderced payment thereof if it had been notified son v. Railroad Co., 64 N. Y. 334; La Rue v.
that the same had not been paid; but that Elevator Co. (S. D.) 54 N. W. 808. Within
on the last-named date he became, and has this principle the declarations of the receivever since been, utterly Insolvent, and the er offered In evidence were clearly incompeplaintiff has wholly lost the sum of money t e n t They were not only made more than
for which the draft w a s drawn, to its dam- a month after the alleged receipt of the
age In the sum of $1,000. The defendant de- draft, but were in reference to a matter of
nies the imputed negligence, and sets up In which the receiver did not claim to have
Its answer that the draft was not received any personal knowledge, and which evidentby it until the 21th of June, and w a s imme- ly happened prior to his appointment So it
diately protested for nonpayment, and plain- seems to ns that under no view of this case
tiff duly notified, and this presents the con- was the letter admissible in evidence to
trolling question In the case. The trial re- charge the defendant with negligence.
sulting in favor of defendant, plaintiff apIt Is also claimed that the court erred l a
peals. charging the jury that negligence of the de;tt A s already suggested, the Important, and fendant bank in not making due presentIndeed the only, question of fact in Issue on ment ot the draft would not discharge
the
the trial w a s the date of the receipt of the drawer from liability if he had no funds in
draft by the defendant bank. As evidence the bank applicable to its p a y m e n t
The
tending to support the Issue on its part, the form of the draft in question nowhere applaintiff offered a letter written by the re- pears in the record, and therefore it must be
ceiver of the defendant bank to the plain- assumed, In favor ot the judgment of the
tiffs attorneys on July 28, 1883, in which It court below, that it w a s an ordinary bank
fe stated that the draft in question was taki check drawn by Cowan upon the defendant
en out of the post office at Albany "by Ex- bank, and, considering it as such, there w a s
aminer Jennings on his arrival, June 21st, no error In the Instruction.
,
-and not received by the bank before suspenThe holder's laches In presenting a check for
iion." The court refused to admit the letter payment constitutes no defense In an action
in evidence, and this ruling is assigned as against the drawer unless he is damaged by
'error. The contention for the plaintiff, as the delay, and then only to the extent of his
jwe understand It, is that the receiver of a loss. A check purports to be made upon a denational bank Is the statutory agent of the posit to meet it, and presupposes funds of the
bank, and that his admissions are competent drawer in the hands of the drawee. But, if
Evidence against the association. Conceding the drawer has no such funds at the time
£-but without deciding—this to be the law, of drawing his check, or subsequently withjthe letter in question was clearly incompe- draws them, he commits a fraud upon the
t e n t It is at most but the narrative of a payee, and can suffer no loss or damage
%ast event, and does not appear to have been from the holder's delay in respect to presentfmade by the receiver as a part of some ment or notice. In such case he is liable,
^transaction then pending within the scope of and cannot insist upon a formal demand or
jtils authority. Whenever what an agent did notice of nonpayment 3 Rand. Com. Paper,
Ht,admissible In evidence against his princl- §§ 1106, 1347; 2 Daniel, Neg. I n s t §f 15S7,
¥ « V it is competent to prove what he said 1596.
Jabout the act while doing It, because his
And, finally, It is claimed that the court
declarations or statements, made at the time, erred in overruling plaintiffs motion for a
£&re part of the res gestae. It is for this rea- new trial. Its counsel frankly concedes,
s o n that they are admissible at all. As stat- however, that the ruling of. the trial court
*NT by Mr. Story, the rule Is "that, where the on a motion for a new trial based on the Inp e t s of an agent will bind the principal, there sufficiency of the evidence, or some other
£di representations, declarations, and admis- question of fact, is not assignable error on
£8ons respecting the subject-matter will also appeal, but he seeks to make a distinction
g l n d him, if made at the same time, and con- between the case stated and one where the
r*tltuting a part of the res gestae." 1 Story, motion is based upon the ground that the
S^g. 134. The agent Is the representative of verdict is against law. He contends that
ghe principal in the transaction of business from the undisputed facts and the InstrucSnibraeed within his agency.
Whatever, tions of the court in the case at bar the
gherefore, b e lawfully does in the transac- plaintiff was entitled to a verdict, and that
t i o n of that business, is the act of his princi- I the only remedy for the correction of the er-
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[indictment is designated as No. 781. The
indictment was found upon the testimony of
C. L. Lowe and Thomas Grant, November9,
HABEAS COUPUS—FORMER CONVICTION.
Petitioner was arraigned, and pleaded
A former conviction for unlawful cohabitation 1888.
with a certain woman cannot be considered, on an not guilty. November 23. 1888, petitioner
application for habeas corpus to be discharged changed his plea of not guilty to that of
from imprisonment on conviction of adultery with
the same woman, wuere it was not pleaded as a ! guilty. January 3, 1889, petitioner was sentenced by the court to pay a fine of $100, and
defense.
$34 costs, and to be imprisoned in the peniOn application for habeas corpus,
tentiary six months, the imprisonment to
Richards cfe Moylet for the petitioner. commence to run from said date. It el so apOgden Biles, contra.
pears that on the 23d day of November, 1888,
the petitioner was indicted in said district
ANDERSON, J. The petitioner alleges that court for the crime of unlawful cohabitation
he is a prisoner in the custody of Frank H. J with Barbara Maughan, Elizabeth Maughan,
Dyer, United States marshal for the terri- Margaret Maughan, Mary Maughan, Rachael
tory of Utah, in the penitentiary of said ter- Woodward, and Euphira Maughan, by living
ritory for a criminal offense against the laws and cohabiting with said women as his wives
of the United States, to-wit, adultery; that from the 15th day of January, 1886. to the
such confinement is by virtue of a judgment, 123d day of November, 1888. This indictment
warrant, and the proceedings of record, in- is designated as No. 1.890, and was found
cluding three indictments against him, hia upon the testimony of the petitioner alone,
arraignment thereon, and pleas thereto, re- | who voluntarily appeared before the grand
spectively, and convictions thereon upon his jury at his own request, and gave testimony.
pleas of guilty thereto. A copy of the record On the same day he appeared in open court,
is in each case attached to the petition. He was arraigned, and pleaded guilty to the inalleges that under the judgment in two ot the dictment. January 3, 1889, petitioner was
cases he has been imprisoned in the peniten- sentenced by the court to pay a fine of $100,
tiary for more than six months, and has paid and $31 costs, and be imprisoned in the penithe fines and costs adjudged against him tentiary six months, the imprisonment to run
therein; that he is now imprisoned under the f rom'said date, it further appears that petiother one of the judgments rendered against tioner was also indicted in said court on the
him, and that such imprisonment is illegal, 23d day of November, 1888, for the crime of
for the reason that the court had no jurisdic- adultery alleged to have been committed
tion to pass judgment against him in said on the 1st day of October, 1887, with one
case; that the two judgments which he has Rachael Woodward; that the said indictment
satisfied by suffering the imprisonment, and was designated as No. 1,891, and was found
paying the Ones and costs adjudged against on the testimony of Joseph Howell; that on
him therein, were both for the crime of un- said November *23d petitioner was arraigned,
lawful cohabitation, and that he is now iru-l and pleaded guilty to the indictment, and on
prisoned under the judgment of the court! the 3d day of January, 1889, was sentenced
rendered against him on the indictment tor! by the court to be imprisoned in the penitenadultery; that the offense is the same offense I tiary two years and six months, and pay the
for which he has suffered punishment under Icosts of prosecution, amounting to $29.
the other indictments, and that the Kachael
From the foregoing it will be seen that the
Woodward mentioned in the indictment for petitioner was regularly .ndicted, convicted,
adultery, and in one of the indictments for j and sentenced for the crime of adultery, upon
unlawful cohabitation, is one and the same his plea of guilty made in open court. There
person, and that he is being punished twice is no illegality appearing anywhere in the
for the same offense; that the court had no record of the case. It does not appear in
jurisdiction to render judgment against him which of the three cases the plea of guilty
on his plea of guilty to the indictment of was first entered, nor in which case judgadultery, and that the same is void; and he ment was first rendered. Tt does not appear
prays to be discharged from imprisonment that the Rachael Woodward with whom petithereunder. A writ of habeas corpus was tioner committed adultery on the 1st day ot
heretofore issued in the case, and the peti- October, 1887, was the same Rachael Woodtioner produced in court by the United States ward with whom be unlawfully cohabited
marshal. From the exhibits attached to the from the 15th day of January, 1886, to Nopetition, it appears that on the 9th day of vember 23d, 1888. If such was the fact, and
January, 18B6, the petitioner was indicted it had been properly pleaded and proved on
in the district court of the First judicial dis- the trial, it would have constituted a good
trict for the crime of unlawful cohabitation, defense to the indictment for adultery; but
alleged to have been committed between Au- this court cannot, on habeas corpus, hear
gust 1, 1884, and December 10, 1885, by liv- evidence nor determine the questions from
ing and cohabiting during said period of anything outside of the record in this case.
tune with Barbara Maughan, Elizabeth Hull,
Counsel for petitioner insists that the recErdner Maughan, Maggie Nibley, Mary Hale ords attached to his petition show that the
Maughan, Kachael AVoodward Maughan. and adultery was committed with one of the same
Francis Nibley Maughan, as his wives. This I wouK-n, to-wit, Rachael Woodward, with.
In
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whom he had unlawfully cohabited, because IIn denying him the relief prayed for, HEXof the identity of the name in the indictments DERSON, J., speaking for the court, used the
numbered 1,890 and 1,891, and cites Whart. following language:,* "When a person is
Crim. Ev. § 802, and State v. Kelsoe, 76 Mo. charged with a crime before a court having
505. These authorities go no further than to jurisdiction to determine his guilt or innolay down the doctrine that identity of name cence, and he claims immunity by reason of
raises a presumption, more or less strong, a former conviction or acquittal, the burden
according to circumstances, of identity of is upon him to plead it in answer to the
person. Wharton says: " Identity of name is charge and establish it by his evidence; and
not by itself, when the name is common, and if he does not do so it is waived. 1 Bish.
when it is borne by several persons, in the Crim. Proc. § 806; 1 Whart. Crim. Law, §
same circle of society, sufficient to sustain a 538 et seq.; Ex parte Kaufman. 73 Mo. 588;
conclusion of identity of person. The infer- In re Bogart, 2 Sawy. 396; State v. Webb,
ence, however, rises in strength, with cir- 74 Mo. 333. The question of a former concumstances indicating the improbability of viction was a matter of defense, and was a
there being two persons of the same name at question for the determination of the court
the same place, at the same time, and when having jurisdiction to try the charge. It inthere was no proof that there is any other volves an issue of fact, the identity of the ofperson bearing the name. Names, therefore, fenses charged, the existence and priority of
with other circumstances, are facts from'[the record relied upon, and on habeas corpus
this court cannot try such an issue." The
which identity can be presumed." .
In the case of State v. Kelsoe, supra, the j rule here laid down is decisive of this case.
defendant was indicted for burglary under i and we see no reason to change or modify it.
the name of Charles Kelsoe, alias McCarty. Whatever merit there may be in the petiAt the trial he testified in his own behalf, tioner's case is a proper subject for executive
and for the purposes of affecting his cred- consideration, but this court can afford him
ibility the state introduced the record of the no relief. The prayer of the petitioner is
conviction of Charles Kelsoe, alias McCarty, denied, and an order will be entered accordof grand larceny, and this was claimed to be j taglverror; but the court held that identity of such
ZANE, O. J., and HENDERSON, J., concur.
a name was sufficient to raise a presumption
of identity of person, and was therefore
proper evidence to go to the jury. But in
WATSON V. COBEY.
this case even the presumption of identity of
person from identity of name does not appear
HAYS V. SAME.
from the indictment, nor any part of the rec(Supreme Court of TJtalu Jan. 25,1889.)1
ord in the adultery case, but only appears in |
CORPORATIONS—INCORPORATION A*I>
the record of another case, and hence cannot j MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
1
—STATUTES.
be considered in determining the question 1. Laws Utah 1888, c. 48. is entitled "An act pronow presented. In none of the cases cited viding for the incorporation of cities. w The first
by counsel for petitioner, nor in any we have ] five sections of article 1 provide for the manner
which unincorporated territory may incorporate
been able to find, has it been held that on in
under the act. Sections 0-9 provide for the mode
habeas corpus facts not appearing in some of incorporation of cities under the a c t Sections
part of the record of the case could be con- ! 10—13 are general. Sections 14,15, classify existmunicipalities into two classes. Sections 16sidered. It was the duty of petitioner, if he ing
19 relate to municipal government, and provide
relied for defense upon the fact of a former | for the mode of election of city officers. A subseconviction, to have pleaded it in the district quent section of another article provides that cercourt, instead of pleading it for the first time tain sections "are hereby made applicable to all
cities now organized in this terrion habeas corpus in this court. In the case incorporated
tory, ** and sections lft-19 of article 1 are not menof In re Barton, ante, 998, (decided at this tioned, though a section of another article, which
term,) the same principle was involved. In re-enacts the same principle as those sections,
a proviso that it shall not interfere with any
that case Barton was indicted for unlawful iI with
existing mode of elections, is included. Article 1,
cohabitation with one Mary Beesley, and also I S ft, provides that when the common council call
for adultery committed with Mary Beesley | an election to determine whether the city shall bo
during the time covered by the first indict- reincorporated under the act, they shall give noof the class to which the city will belong if
ment. Both indictmentB were found by the | tice
reincorporated. Held\ that sections 16-19, art. 1,
same grand jury, upon the same evidence, did not apply to an incorporated city, whose
and both indictments were presented at the I charter provided for the manner of electing its ofexisting at the taking effect of the act, until
same time. Barton pleaded guilty to both i itfleers,
became reincorporated under section 6, and it
indictments on the same day. The court was immaterial that its common council had taken
suspended sentence in the case for unlawful 1steps to ascertain its class, under section 14.
cohabitation, and sentenced him to imprison- 2. In Utah territory the fact that a statute has
ment on the charge of adultery, and he pre- no enacting clause does not per seinvalidate it.
sented his petition to this court, asking to
Appeals from district court. First district.
be discharged on habeas corpus from imThe opinion of the lower court was as folprisonment, because the district court had! lows:
no jurisdiction to sentence him in the adul-! "This is a hearing upon a motion to quash
tery case, after his conviction on the plea of
guilty to the charge of unlawful cohabitation. Publication delayed by failure to receive copy.
v.21p.no.!7—m
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drove by the gas station, a clerk in the
station pointed towards the Corsica. Thus,
the dispatch call was irrefutably linked to a
person who, by her non-verbal communications, emphatically gave further weight to
the officer's suspicion that the driver of the
white vehicle was driving in an intoxicated
state. Based on that information and his
perceptions, the arresting officer stopped
plaintiffs vehicle, the white Corsica, shortly thereafter on suspicion of DUI, although
he acknowledged that he did not observe
any other driving violations.
Even absent other driving violations, an
investigatory stop of a motor vehicle is
permissible when a police officer has a
reasonable suspicion that the driver is committing or has committed a drunk driving
offense. See § 42-4-1202.1, C.R.S. (1984
Repl.Vol. 17) (expressly authorizing such
investigatory stops). See also Johnson v.
Motor Vehicle Division, 38 Colo.App. 230,
556 P.2d 488 (1976) (rejecting argument
that any traffic violation separate and distinct from drunk driving offense was necessary to invoke the requirements of the
former implied consent law).
[3] In determining the validity of an
investigatory stop, the first inquiry is
whether there were specific and articulable
facts known to the police officer which,
taken together with rational inferences
from these facts, created a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity so as to justify
the intrusion into the individual's personal
security. People v. Garcia, 789 P.2d 190
(Colo.1990); People v. Mascarenas, 726
P.2d 644 (Colo. 1986).
We conclude that the investigatory stop
in this case was justified under the reasonable suspicion standard. Here, the arresting officer's observations, including the
clerk's communications to him almost immediately after the report must have been
given, were sufficient to provide him with a
reasonable suspicion that the driver of the
white vehicle was driving under the influence, and the investigatory stop was therefore justified. See § 42-4-1202.1; People
v. Contreras, 780 P.2d 552 (Colo.1989);
People v. Melgosa, 753 P.2d 221 (Colo.
1988). Thus, the hearing officer and the

district court properly rejected plaintiffs
challenges to the validity of the initial investigatory stop.
Moreover, it is undisputed that, following
the initial stop, the information obtained by
the arresting officer provided him with
probable cause for plaintiff's DUI arrest
and that plaintiff thereafter submitted to a
breath test, which showed an alcohol concentration of .257 grams of alcohol per 210
liters of breath. Accordingly, the hearing
officer properly revoked plaintiffs driver's
license pursuant to § 42-2-122.1, and the
district court properly upheld the revocation.
The judgment is affirmed.
METZGER and RULAND, J J , concur.
(o
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The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Edgar Burton ROBINSON,
Defendant-Appellant
No. 90CA1566.
Colorado Court of Appeals,
Div. V.
Feb. 27, 1992.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing
March 26, 1992.
Certiorari Granted Aug. 17, 1992.
Cross-Petition for Certiorari
Denied Aug. 17, 1992.
Defendant appealed from order of the
District Court, Larimer County, John-David
Sullivan, J., which dismissed motion to vacate conviction. The Court of Appeals,
Davidson, J., held that statute of limitations on collateral attacks on convictions
applied to Rule 35 motion to vacate.
Affirmed.
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1. Criminal Law *>998(14)
^ n m )
7. J u d g m e n t
Although appeal duplicating previously
Successful attack on use of conviction
d,sm.ssed appea may be dismissed, there is in one proceeding does not prevent r ^
S T Z T S S t h , a t f d e f e n d K a n t a f f i ™ a t **- * • * » of the issue of t h v a ' l S t y of £
denied. Rules Crim.Proc., R u l e ^

*

2. Statutes e=>181(l), 188
In interpreting statutory provisions,
court must seek to discern intent of the
General Assembly, looking first to language of statute itself, then giving effect
to statutory terms in accordance with their
commonly accepted meaning.
3. Criminal Law «=>998(14)
Intent of the General Assembly in creating time limitations on collateral attacks
on convictions is to avoid litigation of stale
claims and to avoid frustration of statutory
provisions directed at repeat, prior, and habitual offenders. West's C.R.S.A. § 16-5402(2).

I Z T ^ ^ l ^

**"**'

**•

8. Habeas Corpus «=>203
Writs of habeas corpus, of which Rule
35 motion to vacate is a modern equivalent,
were traditionally considered collateral proceedings. Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 35.
9. Statutes <S»212.1
General Assembly is presumed cognizant of judicial precedent in a particular
area when it enacts legislation in that area.
10. Statutes *»181(1)
Court must construe statute to effectuate legislative intent.

11. Criminal Law *=»998(14)
Provision of Rule 35 that one who is
4. Criminal Law <*=*998(14)
aggrieved and claims a right to be released
Term "collaterally attacked" as used in or to have judgment set aside may file a
statute setting time limits on collateral at- motion for that relief "at any time" does
tacks on convictions includes Rule 35(c) mo- not take precedence over statute of limitations to vacate. West's C.R.S.A. § 16-5- tions on collateral attacks on convictions.
402; Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 35(c).
West's C.R.S.A. § 16-5-402; Rules Crim.
See publication Words and Phrases
Proc., Rule 35(c).
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

5. Criminal Law «=>998(1, 21)
Successful Rule 35 attack results in
conviction at issue being vacated and the
validity of that conviction may not be relitigated in any subsequent proceeding, although in some circumstances the prosecution may refile the original charge and
defendant may face reconviction. Rules
Crim.Proc., Rule 35.

12. Constitutional Law «=»55
If legislative act is based in public policy rather than an attempt to regulate dayto-day procedural operations of court, it
does not usurp Supreme Court's rule making authority.
13. Constitutional Law *=»48(3)
Statute must be construed so as to
avoid constitutional infirmities.

14. Habeas Corpus «=>443, 503
5. Judgment *=»518, 713(1)
Only claims cognizable in constitutionAttack on use of conviction is an at- ally guaranteed state habeas corpus protempt to avoid, defeat, or evade judgment ceeding are that the sentence was beyond
>r to deny its force and effect in some jurisdictional limits or that the conviction
ncidental proceeding; successful attack on was invalid because the court lacked jurisise bars only the use of the prior convic- diction over the subject matter of the deion in that incidental proceeding, and the fendant West's C.R.S.A. Const. Art. 2,
onviction itself remains.
§21.
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15. Criminal Law e»998(14)
Statute of limitations on collateral attacks on convictions does not limit collateral attacks on jurisdictional grounds.
West's C.R.S.A. § 16-5-402; West's
C.R.S.A. Const. Art. 2, § 21.
16. Constitutional Law «»55
Habeas Corpus <S=>912
General Assembly may impose statutory conditions on state applications for
habeas corpus. West's C.R.S.A. Const
Art. 2, § 21.
17. Criminal Law «=»998(14)
Defendant was not excused from failure to attack conviction within the statutory time period on the grounds that he had
no present need to attack the conviction
until it was used in habitual offender proceeding, and defendant was nonetheless required to attack the conviction before the
statutory deadline of July 1, 1989. West's
C.R.S.A. § 16-5-402.
18. Constitutional Law *»250.2(5)
Criminal Law «=>998(14)
Application to defendant of statute of
limitations on collateral attacks on convictions did not deny him equal protection of
the law despite claim that he was barred by
lack of present need from timely filing his
postconviction challenge. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 14; West's C.R.S.A. § 16-5-402.
Gale A. Norton, Atty. Gen., Raymond T.
Slaughter, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Timothy M. Tymkovich, Sol. Gen., Clement P.
Engle, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.
David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Patrick J. Mulligan, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, for defendantappellant.
Opinion by Judge DAVIDSON.
Defendant, Edgar Burton Robinson, appeals from the order of the trial court
dismissing his Crim. P. 35(c) motion as untimely. We affirm.
In 1977, defendant entered a plea of
guilty to first degree sexual assault. He

received a two-year deferred sentence. In
1990, defendant filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion to vacate the conviction.
In its opposition brief, the prosecution
argued that the motion was untimely pursuant to § 16-5-402, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol.
8A). That statute provides that a person
may not "collaterally attack the validity" of
a conviction unless the attack is begun
within various time spans ranging from six
months for petty offenses to no limit for
class 1 felonies. The period applicable to
first degree assault is three years.
The trial court agreed that the motion
was untimely, and it was dismissed without
a hearing. On appeal, defendant contends
that the dismissal was in error because
§ 16-5-402 does not apply to attacks on
convictions filed pursuant to Crim. P. 35.
We disagree.
I.
Ill As a threshold matter, we address
the People's argument that defendant's appeal should be dismissed because he may
have litigated the merits of this Crim. P.
35(c) claim in another proceeding and has
failed to allege specifically that his claims
are not duplicative. Although an appeal
duplicating an appeal previously denied
may be dismissed, People v. Holmes, 819
P.2d 541 (Colo.App. 1991), there is no requirement that a defendant affirmatively
assert that the relief sought has not been
previously denied, and we find no indication
in this record that any such duplicative
relief has been considered or denied on
appeal.
II.
Whether motions filed under Crim. P. 35
are included in the provisions of § 16-5402 is a matter of first impression in Colorado. Our supreme court specifically declined to reach this issue in People v. Germany, 674 P.2d 345 (Colo. 1983), because it
held that the then current version of the
statute was unconstitutional. However, in
Moland v. People, 757 P.2d 137 (Colo.1988),
the court specifically stated in a footnote
that a defendant's right to obtain postconviction review pursuant to Crim. P. 35
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was subject to the requirements of § 16-5402. While this statement was dictum, we
view it as highly instructive.
Additionally, in People v. Fagerholm,
768 P.2d 689 (Colo. 1989), the supreme court
upheld the constitutionality of § 16-5-402
in the context of a Crim. P. 35 motion. In
People v. Brack, 796 P.2d 49 (Colo.App.
1990), this court also upheld the denial of a
Crim. P. 35 motion based upon § 16-5-402,
although, in those cases, the applicability
of § 16-5-402 to such proceedings was not
challenged.
A.
12,3] In interpreting particular statutory provisions, this court must seek to
discern the intent of the General Assembly,
looking first to the language of the statute
itself, and giving effect to the statutory
terms in accordance with their commonly
accepted meaning. Tkiret v. Kautzky, 792
P.2d 801 (Colo. 1990). The intent of the
General Assembly in creating time limitations on collateral attacks, as stated in
§ 16-5-402(2), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A),
is to avoid litigation of stale claims and to
avoid frustration of the statutory provisions directed at repeat, prior, and habitual
offenders.

tion may not be relitigated in any subsequent proceeding, though in some circumstances the prosecution may refile the original charge, and defendant could face reconviction. See People v. Keenan, 185
Colo. 317, 524 P.2d 604 (1974).
[6,7] In contrast, an attack on the use
of the conviction is an attempt to avoid,
defeat, or evade judgment or to deny its
force and effect in some incidental proceeding. Brennan v. Grover, 158 Colo. 66, 404
P.2d 544 (1965), cert denied, 383 U.S. 926,
86 S.Ct 929, 15 L.Ed.2d 845 (1966). A
successful attack on use bars only the use
of the prior conviction in that incidental
proceeding; the conviction itself remains.
Watkins v. People, 655 P.2d 834 (Colo.
1982). The successful attack on use does
not prevent relitigation of the issue of the
validity of the subject conviction in a subsequent proceeding, or even in a Crim. P. 35
attack of the same conviction. Wright v.
People, 690 P.2d 1257 (Colo.1984).

14] Defendant argues that "collateral
attack" refers only to an attack on the use
of the conviction, such as a motion to suppress an habitual offender count, but not to
a "direct" attack on a conviction pursuant
to Crim. P. 35. On the other hand, the
People argue that, in the criminal context,
there is no distinction between collateral
attacks and other post-conviction relief and
they urge this court to construe the term
"collaterally attack" as used in § 16-5-402
to include attacks under Crim. P. 35. Although we find significant distinction between collateral attacks and other types of
post-conviction relief, we nevertheless hold
that "collaterally attack" as used in § 165-402 necessarily includes relief sought
pursuant to Crim. P. 35.

[8] However, although avenues for collateral attacks do differ, an attack on the
conviction itself has long been considered a
collateral attack, whether through Crim. P.
35 or its federal counterpart, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (1988). See Bales v. People, 713
P.2d 1280 (Colo.1986) ("a defendant may
collaterally attack a prior conviction by either filing a Crim. P. 35(c) motion in the
sentencing court or by filing a proper motion to prohibit the prosecution from using
evidence of a prior conviction in a pending
criminal prosecution"); U.S. v. Hayman,
342 U.S. 205, 72 S.Ct. 263, 96 L.Ed. 232
(1952); U.S. v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 102
S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982); U.S. v.
Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 60
L.Ed.2d 805 (1979). See also People v.
Fagerholm, supra, (Vollack, J., dissenting)
("[defendant] collaterally attacked both prior convictions under Crim. P. 35"). Also,
writs of habeas corpus, of which Crim. P.
35 is a modern equivalent, were traditionally considered collateral proceedings. See
U.S. v. Hayman, supra.

15] A successful Crim. P. 35 attack results in the conviction at issue being vacated. Thereafter, the validity of that convic-

[9] The General Assembly is presumed
cognizant of judicial precedent in a particular area when it enacts legislation in that
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area. Rauachenberger v. Radetsky, 745
P.2d 640 (Colo.1987). We therefore may
assume that it was fully aware of the accepted uses of the term "collaterally attack" as used in the lexicon of criminal law.
[10] Moreover, a common sense reading
of the plain language of the statute dictates the conclusion that the General Assembly intended not a technical definition
of "collateral," but its commonly accepted
meaning within a criminal law context.
"Statutes must be construed so as to effectuate their intent and beneficial purposes,
not to defeat them." Colorado State
Board of Medical Examiners v. Saddoris,
825 P.2d 39 (Colo.1992). The purpose of
the statute is explicit—to prevent defendants from thwarting the effect of repeat
offender statutes and to end rampant relitigation of stale claims. The scope of the
statute is sweeping ("no person shall collaterally attack the validity of a [prior conviction] unless — "), and reading the statute
as defendant urges would limit it drastically. To the contrary, we must construe a
statute to effectuate the legislative intent,
Martinez v. Continental Enterprises, 730
P.2d 308 (Colo.1986), and the intent here is
unmistakable. Cf. People v. Fagerholm,
supra; Moland v. People, supra.
B.
[11] Defendant argues, however, that
even if § 16-5-402 applies to Crim. P. 35
motions, Crim. P. 35(c)(3) provides that one
who is aggrieved and claims a right to be
released or to have a judgment set aside
may file a motion for such relief at any
time, and, citing People v. McKenna, 196
Colo. 367, 585 P.2d 275 (1978), he contends
that such procedural rule takes precedence
over a procedural statute. We disagree.
[12] If a legislative act is based in public policy rather than as an attempt to
regulate the day-to-day procedural operation of the court, it does not usurp the
supreme court's rule making authority.
People v. McKenna, supra.
Here, the statute's stated goals include
preventing difficulties in litigating stale

claims and also preventing frustration of
statutes aimed at repeat, prior, and habitual offenders. Section 16-5-402 had such
a severe impact upon the ability of prior
offenders to attack a conviction that an
inclusion of a grace period after its effective date was necessary to render it constitutional. People v. Fagerholm, supra.
Thus, while it also had an incidental effect
upon procedure, the statute is primarily an
expression of public policy. See ABA,
Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard
22-2.4 (2d ed. 1982). See also Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 65
S.Ct. 1137, 89 L.Ed. 1628 (1945) (statutes of
limitation "represent a public policy about
the privilege to litigate"). Accordingly,
here, the statute controls over the rule.
See People v. Hollis, 670 P.2d 441 (Colo.
App.1983).
C.
[13] A statute must be construed so as
to avoid constitutional infirmities. People
v. Washburn, 197 Colo. 419, 593 P.2d 962
(1979). Defendant argues that the application of Crim. P. 35 motions to § 16-5-402
will render the statute unconstitutional because the statute will conflict with Colo.
Const, art. II, § 21, which prohibits any
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
First, we note that although our supreme
court did not specifically address the state
suspension clause, the court upheld the
constitutionality of § 16-5-402 in the context of a Crim. P. 35 motion in People v.
Fagerholm, supra.
[14,15] Secondly, we do not necessarily
agree that the collateral attacks foreclosed
by § 16-5-402 are those guaranteed by the
state suspension clause. The only claims
cognizable in a constitutionally guaranteed
state habeas corpus proceeding are these:
(1) the sentence was beyond jurisdictional
limits, or (2) the conviction was invalid because the court lacked jurisdiction over the
subject matter or the defendant. See Stilley v. Tinsley, 153 Colo. 66, 385 P.2d 677
(1963). The statute does not limit collateral
attacks made on those grounds. See
§§ 16-5-402(2) (a) and (b), C.R.S. (1986
Repl.Vol. 8B). Instead, the statute limits

only those collateral attacks previously
made available by legislative and judicial
expansion of the scope of postconviction
relief beyond that which is constitutionally
mandated.
[16] Third, the General Assembly may
impose statutory conditions on state applications for habeas corpus. See People ex
rel. Wyse v. District Court, 180 Colo. 88,
503 P.2d 154 (1972); Stilley v. Tinsley,
supra; see also § 13-45-101, C.R.S. (1987
Repl.Vol. 6A) and § 18-1-410, C.R.S. (1986
Repl.Vol. 8B). And, similar state statutes
of limitations on collateral attacks have
been upheld as constitutional. See Davis v.
State, 443 N.W.2d 707 (Iowa 1989) (state
legislature may attach reasonable time
limitations to the exercise of state constitutional rights). See also United States v.
Randolph, 262 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.1958), cert
denied, 359 U.S. 1004, 79 S.Ct 1143, 3
L.Ed.2d 1032 (1959) (upholds Illinois' fiveyear statute of limitations for post-conviction relief).
Having considered this jurisprudence, we
determine that § lfr-5-402 must be construed to include Crim. P. 35 motions within its terms. However, insofar as defendant's argument raises a claim of facial
unconstitutionality, we do not have jurisdiction to decide that issue. Section 13-4102(l)(b), C.R.S. (1987 RepLVol. 6A).

tory deadlines be filed by July 1, 1989.
People v. Stephens is dispositive. Accordingly, defendant here has failed to establish a lack of present need.
IV.
[18] For the same reason, we reject defendant's contention that he has been denied equal protection of the law. Defendant's argument is premised on the assumption that he was barred by a lack of
present need from timely filing his postconviction challenge. Specifically, he contends
that habitual criminal charges filed against
a defendant in June 1989 could be attacked,
but not those filed after the July 1 deadline. Since we have determined that defendant was not barred by lack of present
need, we also reject his equal protection
argument.
To the extent that we have jurisdiction of
the issues raised, the order is affirmed.
PLANK and ROTHENBERG, JJ.,
concur.
IMVNUMUR SYSTEM!

Christine C. MARTINEZ,
III.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
[17] Defendant also contends that the
v.
trial court erred in finding that he was not
excused for his failure to attack the convicPaillette Ann SHAPLAND,
tion within the statutory time period. We
Defendant-Appellee.
disagree.
No. 90CA2142.
Citing Moland v. People, supra, defenColorado
Court of Appeals,
dant argues that he had no "present need"
Div. III.
to attack the conviction until its use in
habitual offender proceedings and that,
Feb. 27, 1992.
therefore, his neglect was excusable.
Rehearing Denied April 2, 1992.
However, in People v. Stephens (Colo.App.
Certiorari Denied Aug. 10, 1992.
No. 90CA1641, February 27, 1992), we held
that notwithstanding any present need requirements as set forth in Moland v. PeoIn negligence action, plaintiff sought
ple, § 16-5-402, as construed in People v.
Fagerholm, supra, requires that all collat- damages for injuries arising from automoeral attacks otherwise barred by the statu- bile accident. The District Court of the
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APPENDIX—Continued
(If your answer is "No," do not answer
any further questions. Sign this form
and return it to the court.)
3. Did the plaintiffs own negligence account for 60 percent or more of the
total negligence that proximately
caused his/her injuries or damages?
Answer:
(Yes or No)
(If your answer is "Yes," do not answer any any further questions. Sign
this form and return it to the court.)
4. What is the total amount of plaintiffs damages, determined without reference to the amount of plaintiffs negligence?
Amount in dollars: $
5. Using 100 percent as the total combined negligence which proximately
caused the injuries or damages to the
plaintiff, what are the percentages of
such negligence to be allocated to the
plaintiff and defendant?
Plaintiff
%
Defendant
%
(Total must equal 100%)
Signature of Foreman
OPINION ON PETITION TO REHEAR
Plaintiff has filed a respectful and
thoughtful Petition for Rehearing requesting argument on (1) the advisability of retaining joint and several liability in certain
limited circumstances, and (2) the Opinion's
treatment of nonparty tort-feasors. Because such further guidance should await
an appropriate controversy, the petition is
accordingly denied.
REID, C.J., and O'BRIEN,
DAUGHTREY and ANDERSON, JJ.,
concur.

Francis W. POTTS, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
STATE of Tennessee, RespondentAppellee.
Supreme Court of Tennessee,
at Jackson.
June 8, 1992.
Petitioner appealed from dismissal of
his petition for habeas corpus relief in the
Criminal Court, Shelby County, Joseph B.
Dailey, J. The Supreme Court, Daughtrey,
J., held that three-year statute of limitations on filing of post-conviction petitions is
not unconstitutional suspension of writ of
habeas corpus.
Affirmed.
1. Criminal Law *=>998(14)
Routine challenge to pre-1986 conviction has to have been lodged no later than
June 30, 1989. T.C.A. § 40-30-102.
2. Criminal Law e»978
Habeas Corpus «=>912
Statute imposing three-year limitations
period on filing of post-conviction petitions
is not unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus; the statute of limitations is inapplicable to habeas corpus proceedings, because the two avenues of collateral attack
are theoretically and statutorily distinct.
Const. Art. 1, § 15; T.C.A. §§ 29-21-101 et
seq., 40-30-101 et seq., 40-30-105.
3. Habeas Corpus *=»224, 445
Writ of habeas corpus will issue only
in case of void judgment or to free prisoner
held in custody after his term of imprisonment has expired. Const. Art. 1, § 15;
T.C.A. §§ 29-21-101 et seq., 40-30-101 et
seq., 40-30-105.
4. Habeas Corpus «=»203, 206
Unlike post-conviction petition, purpose
of habeas corpus petition is to contest void
and not merely voidable judgments; petitioner cannot collaterally attack facially
valid conviction in habeas corpus proceeding.

5. Criminal Law <*»998(14)
Trial Courts should not treat true habeas petitions filed outside post-conviction
statute of limitations as post-conviction petitions. T.C.A. § 40-30-102.
6. Habeas Corpus *=>603
Challenges to void convictions and expired terms of imprisonment survive beyond time prescribed in post-conviction
statute of limitations, and Great Writ cannot be defeated by conversion to post-conviction proceedings and subsequent dismissal due to statutory time bar. T.C.A. § 4030-102.
7. Habeas Corpus «=>285, 603
Habeas corpus has no statutory time
limitations; even after post-conviction petition is dismissed as untimely, prisoner may
assert in petition for writ of habeas corpus
that his conviction is void or that he is
being wrongfully confined beyond his term
of imprisonment.
Brett Stein, Memphis, for petitioner-appellant.
Charles W. Burson, Atty. Gen. and Reporter, Kathy Principe, Asst. Atty. Gen.,
Nashville, for respondent-appellee.
OPINION
DAUGHTREY, Justice.
The appellant, Francis W. Potts, appeals
directly to this Court from the dismissal of
his petition for post-conviction relief. Potts
asks us to declare that the three-year statute of limitations on the filing of postconviction petitions constitutes an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus, in violation of the provisions of
Article I, § 15 of the Tennessee Constitution. For the reasons set out below, we
find no merit to this contention and affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
On August 24, 1990, Potts was indicted
for a third offense DUI. On the date set
for trial, he entered a guilty plea to the
basic DUI charge but took issue with the
charge that he was a third-time offender.
Potts filed a "Motion in the Nature of a
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief," chal833 S W 2 d - 3

lenging the validity of prior guilty pleas
that he had entered in 1982 and 1983 to
charges of DUI. The motion also requested a consolidation of the petition with the
pending DUI case. The state agreed to
consolidate the post-conviction action with
the guilty plea submission, but argued that
the post-conviction challenge to the prior
guilty pleas was time-barred by the provisions of T.C.A. § 40-30-102. The trial
judge agreed with the state and dismissed
the post-conviction petition. The court
then adjudged Potts guilty of a third-offense DUI and sentenced him accordingly.
This appeal followed, pursuant to the jurisdictional provision in T.C.A. § 16-4-108.
In 1986, the General Assembly enacted
T.C.A. § 40-30-102. Pursuant to that provision:
A prisoner in custody under sentence
of a court of this state must petition for
post-conviction relief under this chapter
within three (3) years of the date of the
final action of the highest state appellate
court to which an appeal is taken or
consideration of such petition shall be
barred.
By its terms, the new provision was to take
effect on July 1, 1986.
[1] However, prior to the enactment of
§ 40-30-102, there had been no limitation
on the filing of post-conviction petitions in
Tennessee. Consequently, in order to
avoid due process problems, the courts of
this state ruled that the new statute of
limitations would be given prospective application only. See, e.g., State v. Masucci,
764 S.W.2d 90, 91 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988);
State v. St. John, 751 S.W.2d 453, 454
(Tenn.Crim.App. 1988); Abston v. State,
749 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988).
Thus, a routine challenge to a pre-1986
conviction has to have been lodged no later
than June 30, 1989. Masucci, 754 S.W.2d
at 91.
[2] The appellant's petition challenging
his pre-1986 DUI convictions was filed after June 30, 1989, and, on the basis of case
authority set out above, the trial court held
that the post-conviction petition was barred
by the statute of limitations. On appeal,
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Potts contests the constitutionality of
T.C.A. § 40-30-102. He argues that in imposing a statute of limitations on post-conviction proceedings, the legislature has unconstitutionally suspended the writ of habeas corpus. Potts relies in this regard on
Article I, § 15 of the Tennessee Constitution, which provides that "the privilege of
the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in case of rebellion
or invasion, the General Assembly shall
declare the public safety requires it."
We find the appellant's contention misplaced. The statute of limitations on the
filing of post-conviction petitions is inapplicable to habeas corpus proceedings, because the two avenues of collateral attack
are theoretically and statutorily distinct.
[3,4] The post-conviction process, set
out in T.C.A. §§ 40-30-101 et seq., provides
for challenges to convictions that are alleged to be either void or voidable because
of the abridgement of constitutional rights.
T.C.A. § 40-30-105. In contrast, it is well
settled in this state that the writ of habeas
corpus, codified at T.C.A. §§ 29-21-101 et
8eq., will issue only in the case of a void
judgment or to free a prisoner held in
custody after his term of imprisonment has
expired. State ex rel. Hall v. Meadows,
215 Tenn. 668, 389 S.W.2d 256, 259 (1965).
Unlike the post-conviction petition, the purpose of a habeas corpus petition is to contest void and not merely voidable judgments. See State ex rel. Newsom v.
Henderson, 221 Tenn. 24, 424 S.W.2d 186,
189 (1968). A petitioner cannot collaterally
attack a facially valid conviction in a habeas corpus proceeding. State ex rel. Hoibrook v. Bomar, 211 Tenn. 243, 364 S.W.2d
887, 888 (1963).

habeas corpus, except to the extent that
habeas petitions are properly treated by
courts as post-conviction petitions.1 Habeas corpus has no statutory time limitation.
Even after a post-conviction petition is dismissed as untimely, a prisoner may assert
in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
that his conviction is void or that he is
being wrongfully confined beyond his term
of imprisonment.
We hold that the provisions of T.C.A.
§ 40-30-102 do not unconstitutionally suspend the writ of habeas corpus in Tennessee. Because the appellant's constitutional
challenge is without merit, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
REID, C.J., and DROWOTA, O'BRIEN
and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.
(O iKirNUMMtSYSTEM>

J.T. JONES, Jr., Appellant,
v.
HELENA TRUCK LINES, INC., and
Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company, Appellees.
Supreme Court of Tennessee,
at Jackson.
June 8, 1992.

15-7] The three-year statute of limitations on the filing of post-conviction petitions in no way affects the writ of habeas
corpus. The provisions of § 40-30-102 are
inapplicable to petitions for the writ of

Employee appealed from an order of
the Shelby County Court, Kay S. Robilio,
J., which rendered judgment for employer
in workers' compensation suit. The Supreme Court, Daughtrey, J., held that: (1)
employee gave employer adequate notice
that he had suffered work-related injury,

I. T.C.A. § 40-30-108 instructs trial courts to
treat habeas petitions as post-conviction petitions "when the relief and procedure authorized
by [the Post-Conviction Procedure Act] appear
adequate and appropriate." Trial courts should
not, however, treat true habeas petitions filed
outside the § 40-30-102 statute of limitations as

post-conviction petitions. Challenges to void
convictions and expired terms of imprisonment
survive beyond the time prescribed in § 40-30102, and the Great Writ cannot be defeated by
conversion to post-convictions proceedings pursuant to § 40-30-108 and subsequent dismissal
because of the § 40-30-102 time bar.

and (2) causation was adequately established.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Workers' Compensation «=»1217
Employee must give required notice to
employer that he has sustained work-related injury before workers' compensation
benefits can be collected. T.C.A. § 50-6201.
2. Workers* Compensation <*=>1221
Employee's notice of injury to employer for workers' compensation purposes
must be calculated reasonably to convey
message that employee has suffered injury
arising out of and in course of his employment. T.C.A. § 50-6-201.
3. Workers' Compensation *=>1221, 1676
Employee reasonably conveyed to his
employer that he had been involved in
work-related accident and thereby suffered
injury arising out of and in course of his
employment, as was required for receipt of
workers' compensation benefits; testimony
by employee's supervisor that employee
never told him of work-related injury was
as easily attributable to supervisor's oversight as it was to employee's failure to
communicate both nature and cause of his
injury. T.C.A. § 50-6-201.
4. Workers' Compensation *»1245
Court could not impute co-worker's
knowledge of employee's work-related injury to employer for purposes of determining
whether employer was given proper notice
of employee's work-related injury for workers' compensation purposes. T.C.A. § 506-201.
5. Workers' Compensation <S=>1252
Although lack of prejudice, by itself, is
insufficient to excuse employee's failure to
give employer notice of work-related injury, such matter is germane to determination of whether employer was given adequate notice for workers' compensation
purposes. T.C.A. § 50-6-201.
6. Workers' Compensation *»1492
Causation was adequately established
in workers' compensation proceeding by

testimony of treating physician, which corroborated employee's testimony.
7. Workers' Compensation *=»861
When determining on remand proper
amount of workers' compensation benefits
to award employee for permanent partial
disability to body as a whole, court should
consider that employee possessed few
transferable skills and that at time of trial,
employee, who was formerly a truck driver, was working as a security guard and
earning approximately 35% of his salary
before being injured.
8. Workers' Compensation «=>1733
When trial court in workers' compensation suit has heard all proof and intends to
rule in employer's favor on some ground
authorized by statute or by case law, court
should also make contingent findings concerning extent to which employee would
otherwise be entitled to recover.
Ira M. Thomas, Memphis, for appellant
Richard D. Click, Memphis, for appellees.
OPINION
DAUGHTREY, Justice.
This workers' compensation appeal requires us to review the sufficiency of the
employee's notice that he was injured on
the job. The trial court dismissed the action, ruling that the employee knew that he
had sustained a work-related injury but
failed fully to communicate this knowledge
to his employer. For reasons set forth
below, we disagree with the trial court's
conclusion and find that the employee is
entitled to recovery. Because the trial
court made no findings beyond the ruling
on notice, it is necessary to remand the
case for a determination of the award to
the employee.
We begin with a brief summation of the
facts pertinent to the issue of notice. The
employee, J.T. Jones, was a long-haul truck
driver for the employer, Helena Truck
Lines, Inc. On two separate occasions in
May and June of 1989, Jones slipped and
fell while disembarking from his truck.

